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ENCOURAGING FURTHER INNOVATION:
ARIAD V. ELI LILLY AND THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
REQUIREMENT
*

Joseph Jakas

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1790, Congress passed the first American patent statute,
1
which contained a written description requirement for all patents.
2
The Patent Act was subsequently amended, yet the written

*

J.D. 2012, cum laude, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2005, The
University of Maryland, College Park. I would like to thank Professor David
Opderbeck and Professor Jordan Paradise for their continuing support, advice, and
supervision and to Brigitte Radigan for her comments and assistance.
1
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, §§ 1–7, 1 Stat. 109. see infra note 15; Janice C.
Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological
Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 618 (1998); see also Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). The Act stated:
The grantee or grantees of each patent shall, at the time of granting
the same, deliver to the Secretary of State a specification in writing,
containing a description, accompanied with drafts or models, [if
necessary,] of the thing or things, by him or them invented or
discovered, and described as aforesaid, in said patents; which
specification shall be so particular, and said models so exact, as not
only to distinguish the invention or discovery from other things before
known and used, but also to enable a workman or other person skilled
in the art . . . to make, construct, or use the same, to the end that the
public may have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the
patent term.
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. at 110–11 (emphasis added). The second part
of the statute following “but also” articulates a separate “enablement requirement.”
Id.
2
Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318, 321–22 (“Every inventor, before he
can receive a patent shall . . . deliver a written description of his invention, and of the
manner of using, or process of compounding the same, in such full, clear, and exact
terms, as to distinguish the same from all other things before known, and to enable
any person skilled in the art or science of which it is a branch, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make, compound, and use the same.”); Patent Act of 1836,
ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (“[H]e shall deliver a written description of his
invention or discover, and of the manner and process of making, constructing, using,
and compounding the same, in such full, clear, and exact terms, avoiding
unnecessary prolixity, as to enable any person skilled in the art or science to which it
appertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make, construct, compound,
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description requirement is still included in the most up-to-date
3
patent law statute. Existing in nearly the same form for over 200
years, the written description requirement is an essential element to
patent law. Recently, however, the purpose and scope of this
foundational patent requirement has become a subject of heated
4
debate within the patent law community. Highlighted by the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s (CAFC) controversial decision in
5
the 2010 case Ariad Pharmaceuticals v. Eli Lilly & Co., much of the
debate focuses on the CAFC’s recent application of the written
6
description requirement to emerging biotechnology inventions, and,
as a result, on the potential impact on biotechnology innovation and
7
on innovation within the patent system as a whole.
and use the same.”); Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201; Patent Act of
1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 752.
3
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description
of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same . . . .”).
4
See, e.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1361–67 (Radar, J., dissenting); Anascape, Ltd., v.
Nintendo of America, Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Gajarsa, J.,
concurring); Brief for Amgen, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 5–7,
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 02-CV11280); Brief for Microsoft Co. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2–4,
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 02-CV11280); Brief for Regents of the University of California et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 8–10, Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 02-CV-11280)[hereinafter Regents Amicus Brief]; Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1–2, Ariad Pharm., Inc. v.
Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 02-CV-11280); Chris Holman,
Ariad v. Eli Lilly: Pragmatism Prevails over Coherent Patent Doctrine, HOLMAN’S BIOTECH
IP
BLOG
(Mar.
23,
2010,
11:17
A.M.),
http://holmansbiotechipblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/ariad-v-eli-lilly-pragmatismprevails.html.
5
Ariad, 598 F.3d 1336 (majority opinion).
6
See, e.g., Alison E. Cantor, Using the Written Description and Enablement
Requirements to Limit Biotechnology Patents, 14 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 267 (2000).
7
See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1359 (Newman, J., concurring); Regents Amicus Brief, supra
note 4, at 9–10; Warren Woessner, Ariad v. Lilly Comes Down (On Us)—Judge Lourie
Rules!,
PATENTS4LIFE
BLOG
(March
23,
2010),
http://www.patents4life.com/2010/03/ariad-v-lilly-comes-down-on-us-%E2%80%93judge-lourie-rules/. See generally Cantor, supra note 6 (discussing how the trend of
using the written description and enablement requirements to limit biotechnology
patents in particular); David Kelly, The Federal Circuit Transforms the Written Description
into a Biotech-Specific Hurdle to Obtaining Patent Protection for Biotechnology Patents, 13
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 249 (2002) (discussing how the current application of the
written description requirement could create special standards for the biotechnology
industry and how this could negatively impact biotechnology innovation); Shraddha
A. Upadhyaya, The Postmodern Written Description Requirement: An Analysis of the
Application of the Heightened Written Description Requirement to Original Claims, 4 MINN.
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The Ariad case was brought by, among others, Ariad
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(collectively, “Ariad”), who alleged infringement of their patent by Eli
8
Lilly & Company (“Lilly”). Ariad’s invention was a method that
stopped a specific protein from binding to human cells in harmful
9
amounts. The court invalidated a number of Ariad’s claims under
the written description requirement because Ariad, while describing
a useful method, failed to describe a specific agent that could
10
accomplish the claimed method. Essentially, Ariad did not possess
11
every invention it claimed on the day it filed for a patent.
Contesting the court’s use of the written description requirement,
Ariad argued that the requirement is satisfied as long as an inventor
merely identifies his invention and through this identification
“enable[s] one of skill in the art to make and use the claimed
12
invention.”
Analyzing the current written description statute, 35 U.S.C. §
13
112, the court affirmed the long-held notion that the first paragraph
of § 112 included two separate patent requirements: the written

INTELL. PROP. REV. 65 (2002) (discussing how the current application of the written
description requirement departs from precedent, and how this uncertainty might
pose problems for the future of biotechnology innovation).
8
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340. Other parties include the Whitehead Institute for
Biomedical Research and Harvard University. Id. at 1336.
9
Id. at 1341.
10
Id. at 1352–53. In fact, through the collaborative work of the plaintiffs, the NF[K]B protein was discovered in the mid-1980s. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
529 F. Supp. 2d 106, 112 (D. Mass. 2007). During the prosecution of their initial
claims, the plaintiffs were consistently rejected by the Patent Office because they
failed to describe all necessary “agents” that would have the desired result of
inhibiting NF-[K]B. Id. at 112–13. The primary reason for rejection was the
plaintiff’s failure to satisfy the enablement requirement of § 112. Id. The broad
claims that the Patent Office eventually approved removed the description of any
“agent.” Id. at 113. After the Ariad decision, it seems that it would have been equally
appropriate to invalidate the original claims under the written description
requirement for failure to adequately show possession of the plaintiffs’ claimed
genus. See infra notes 234–48 and accompanying text.
11
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352.
12
Id. at 1342, 1344.
13
The written description statute states:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make
and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by
the inventor of carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
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description requirement and the enablement requirement.
To
satisfy the enablement requirement, a patent applicant must, through
the patent specification, “teach those [of ordinary skill] in the art to
15
make and use the invention without undue experimentation.” To
satisfy the written description requirement, a patent applicant must,
through the patent specification, allow a person of ordinary skill in
the art to see that the inventor has “possession” of the claimed
16
invention. These two requirements have always been intertwined in
17
the same paragraph of the patent statute. They both encourage full
disclosure of a patentee’s invention in exchange for the exclusive
18
rights granted by a patent. The enablement requirement, however,
might be satisfied if an inventor, aware of a general result, structures
his claims to include a broad range of inventions that he may or may
19
not have possessed at the time he filed for a patent. Rapid advances
and shifting norms in a particular field allow an inventor to anticipate
changes and make claims based on mere speculation, which makes
any inquiry into what the inventor intended to teach confusing and
unclear. The written description requirement avoids this pitfall by
simply establishing—based on specific examples in the
specification—whether or not the inventor actually possessed the full
scope of his claimed invention at the time of filing.
Ariad’s application of the written description requirement not
only fits into the patent system as a whole, but also conforms to
Congress’s overall policy goals over the last thirty years with regard to
20
biotechnology innovation. The current patent system is a result of
14
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1344 (“We . . . hold that § 112, first paragraph, contains two
separate description requirements: a “written description [i] of the invention and [ii]
of the manner and process of making and using [the invention].” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
15
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006);
Cantor, supra note 6, at 283. The enablement requirement is also found in the 1790
patent statute alongside the written description requirement. See sources cited supra
note 2. A patent is enabled as long as a person of ordinary skill in the art can make
and use the invention. See Mueller, supra note 1, at 622.
16
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351.
17
See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
18
See Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Cantor,
supra note 6, at 268.
19
See infra Part II.D.
20
Recent publications provide additional insight into the written description
requirement’s place in the overall goals of the patent system, and how Ariad
maintains the “quid pro quo” of the patent system to reward exclusive rights for
adequate and appropriate disclosure of an invention. See, e.g., Jacob Adam
Schroeder, Written Description: Protecting the Quid Pro Quo Since 1973, 21 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 63 (2010). In his article, Professor Schroeder details
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the constitutional mandate for Congress to “promote the Progress of
21
Science and useful Arts.” The system provides a monetary incentive
22
to inventors by granting them exclusive rights to their inventions.
To earn these rights, an inventor must satisfy a number of
23
requirements, including written description.
To that end, the
patent system ensures that an inventor has a legitimate right to his
claimed invention (i.e., that he actually invented it) and provides
members of the public with notice of the invention so that they may
24
use the inventor’s knowledge for further innovation. Using these
general goals as a backdrop, Congress has targeted the biotechnology
industry by providing further incentives designed to fuel
biotechnology innovation. The Bayh-Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts
signify two major efforts by Congress to stimulate U.S. biotechnology
innovation: the former by providing patent protection to entities that
25
perform the majority of the country’s biotechnology research, and
the latter by, among other things, providing an experimental use
exception against infringement suits for those performing certain
26
targeted biotechnology research.

the primary stances of the current Federal Circuit judges with regard to the scope
and purpose of the written description requirement. Id. at 84–89. The article also
includes a look at how the requirement has been applied at different times over the
last 200 years. Id. at 72–84. But see Krista Stone, Written Description After Ariad v. Eli
Lilly: 35 U.S.C. § 112’s Third Wheel, 11 J. HIGH TECH. L. 191 (2011) (arguing that the
CAFC in Ariad problematically upset the settled expectations of inventors,
particularly those in the biotechnology, and, by focusing on the written description
requirement, missed an opportunity to strengthen enablement case law).
21
U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
22
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1576–80, 1676 (2003); Cantor, supra note 6, at 285–87.
23
35 U.S.C. §§ 100–376 (2006). Specifically, among other requirements, a patent
applicant’s claimed invention must be patentable subject matter, be novel, not be
obvious in light of a prior invention, id. §§ 101–103, include the best mode for
carrying out the invention, and must include claims that “particularly [point] out
and distinctly [claim] the subject matter which the applicant regards as his
invention.” Id. § 112. See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010) (discussing
patentable subject matter); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007)
(discussing nonobviousness); Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52 F.3d 1043 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (discussing requirements for distinctly pointing out the claimed subject
matter); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112 (2006).
24
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1576.
25
See 32 U.S.C. §§ 200–12 (2006); see also infra notes 151–83 and accompanying
text.
26
35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006); see also Sara Boettiger & Alan B. Bennet, Bayh-Dole: If
We Knew then What We Know Now, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 320–23 (2006);
Elizabeth Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do Universities
Deserve Special Treatment?, 59 ME. L. REV. 283, 295–98 (2007).
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Ariad’s application of the written description requirement is
particularly appropriate in the complex and unpredictable field of
biotechnology where the true scope of a claimed invention may be
27
unclear. Such was the case in Ariad where the inventors attempted
to claim a broad invention that they did not actually possess. If courts
erroneously grant broad exclusive rights to those who do not actually
possess the claimed invention, further innovation can be stifled as
28
other researchers may not be able to further the inventive process.
For a complex and ever-changing field like biotechnology, the written
description requirement provides a useful and straightforward tool
for courts in determining what invention an inventor actually
possessed at the time he filed his claim, avoiding the alternative of an
in-depth inquiry into the overall nature of technology over the years.
Some argue, however, that the written description requirement
29
as applied in Ariad and its predecessors
unfairly targets
biotechnology patents by demanding too much specificity from
30
inventors who work on groundbreaking basic research. The fear is
that the pioneers of a technology, specifically those at the university
level, will lose their ability to gain patents over their discoveries as
other entities pick up on basic discoveries and turn those into
31
finalized products.
Further, some scholars argue that Ariad
represents a deviation from prior written description jurisprudence,
leading some to believe that the CAFC’s interpretation of the
32
requirement is inaccurate and improper. These scholars fear that
Ariad’s interpretation of the written description requirement will
negate the incentives for those performing the basic research that
fuels biotechnology innovation, thus impacting negatively the future
33
of U.S. biotechnology research as a whole.
Despite these fears, the written description requirement, as
applied in Ariad, is unlikely to put an end to the current successes of
the biotechnology industry. In fact, it is likely that the CAFC’s use of
the requirement in Ariad will have a positive impact on overall
27

See Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1676; Cantor, supra note 6, at 287.
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1676–78.
29
See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D.
Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
30
See Kelly, supra note 7, at 266 (noting that the written description rewards those
who can sequence DNA the fastest and not those who made a breakthrough
discovery in the first place); Upadhyaya, supra note 6, at 110.
31
See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 7, at 267–68.
32
See Kelly, supra note 7, at 270; Upadhyaya, supra note 8, at 110.
33
Kelly, supra note 7, at 270 (discussing Lilly, a predecessor to Ariad).
28
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34

biotechnology growth and innovation. By applying a simpler and
more straightforward analysis, courts can more easily identify
overbroad claims that the Patent Office should not have granted.
Further, a strong written description requirement encourages patent
applicants to provide the public with a more detailed description of
their invention, helps police overbroad claims, and ensures that
inventors complete their inventions before they are awarded a
35
patent. Through the written description requirement, the system
can appropriately reward those who have legitimate rights to their
inventions by providing additional confidence to those willing to
commit to the long-term investment that is required to develop many
biotechnology products.
This Comment argues that Ariad, through the enforcement of
the written description requirement, illustrates how the CAFC is
promoting biotechnology innovation. Ariad demonstrates that the
written description requirement is an important tool that furthers the
congressional policies of the Bayh-Dole Act, Hatch-Waxman Act, and
the U.S. patent system in general. Part II outlines the general U.S.
patent requirements, focusing specifically on the history of the
written description requirement, which dates back to the first Patent
Act of 1790. Part II shows, through historical and modern case law,
how courts have applied the requirement and why the Ariad decision
upholds the traditional purpose of the requirement. Part III
discusses the general nature of the biotechnology industry, with
particular focus on the Bayh-Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts and the
overall policies that the U.S. patent system seeks to promote in the
industry. Part IV discusses the Ariad decision in detail, looking at
both the CAFC’s analysis supporting its interpretation of the written
description requirement and its ultimate holding with regard to this
requirement. Finally, Part V explains how the Ariad decision and the
CAFC’s interpretation of the written description requirement are
positive steps towards fixing the current innovation problems in the
biotechnology industry and how the decision furthers the overall
goals of the patent system. Specifically, Part V argues that the
decision balances the competing interests in the biotechnology
industry and encourages innovation through industry-university

34

See discussion infra Part V.
See discussion infra Part V; see also Patrick Brian Giles, How to Claim a Gene:
Application of the Patent Disclosure Requirements to Genetic Sequences, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
695 (2011) (discussing the separate enablement and written description
requirements, how they impact the scope of genetic sequence patents, and a
potential method for adequately disclosing genetic sequence genus claims).
35
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cooperation, thereby promoting the congressional intent of the BayhDole and Hatch-Waxman Acts. Part VI concludes.
II. OVERVIEW OF PATENT REQUIREMENTS ESTABLISHED BY U.S.C.
TITLE 35
A. General Patent Characteristics
The patent system as a whole is designed to promote progress
and innovation by granting inventors exclusive rights to their
36
inventions.
The monetary incentive of exclusive rights to an
37
invention encourages inventors to constantly innovate. The system
then benefits the general public, as inventors are pushed to create
beneficial technologies that, without any encouragement, they might
38
not have otherwise invented.
Before rewarding an inventor,
however, the system must ensure that the invention actually
contributes to the arts. To that end, Congress enacted a series of
requirements that must be satisfied in order to determine if an
39
40
41
invention is patentable: utility, novelty, and nonobviousness. To
warrant the issuance of a patent, an invention must provide some
benefit to society and must not be a merely generalized idea, a
technology that is already in existence, or an obvious improvement
42
on existing technology.
While an invention’s value to society lies in its ability to
contribute to the useful arts, to an inventor, a patent is only as
43
valuable as its overall scope and duration.
If the scope of an
inventor’s patent is narrow, other inventors can simply design around
44
the original invention once it is disclosed to the public. Further,
under the current system, a patent generally lasts for only twenty
45
years from the inventor’s filing date. Given the delays that could
occur between a patent’s filing date and the date on which the
36

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1580.
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1580.
38
Id.
39
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
40
Id. § 102.
41
Id. § 103 (2006); see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,
535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) (“The claimed subject matter must be useful, novel, and
not obvious.”); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of
Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 844 (1990).
42
See 1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS §§ 1.01, 3.01, 4.01, 5.01 (2010).
43
See Cantor, supra note 6, at 270; Merges & Nelson, supra note 41, at 840.
44
Cantor, supra note 6, at 270.
45
35 U.S.C. § 154(2) (2006).
37
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product is released on the market, an inventor’s exclusivity period
may end up being significantly shorter than that to which he is
46
entitled under the patent system. In order to provide a sufficient
incentive for inventors to continue to innovate, the value of a patent
must be greater than the overall cost of investment in discovering
47
that invention.
Just as patents that are too narrow provide too little
compensation for inventors, patents that are too broad may provide
48
too much. It is important that a patent only include an inventor’s
actual contribution to the useful arts so that future inventors can be
rewarded for their own contributions. In addition, progress is only
attainable if an inventor discloses the full scope of his invention so
that others can gain the full benefit of the inventor’s discovery; this
disclosure also allows others to avoid infringing on the inventor’s
49
exclusive rights. It is in this regard that the written description fits
into the patent system. Every patent applicant must provide a full
and detailed description of his invention to prove that he not only
possesses the claimed invention but also that he can teach others how
50
to make and use the invention.
Simply put, the patent system
assumes that if an inventor actually invented what he claims, he
should have little difficulty describing it in detail to others of equal
skill and teaching them how to accomplish the same task; if he
cannot, it is unlikely that he actually invented what he is claiming.
Finally, because an inventor is awarded exclusivity from the date
he files for a patent, the inventor must satisfy the descriptive
51
requirements as of that date.
Generally, an inventor cannot
subsequently expand his claimed invention once he has applied to

46

Biotechnology products in particular have long delays between the date on
which patent applications are filed and the date on which the products hit the
market. Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1683. These delays are the result of high
levels of regulatory scrutiny. Id. Specifically, it is estimated that new drugs released
in the mid-90s averaged a mere twelve years of exclusivity by the time they were
introduced to the market. Henry Grabowski, Patents, Innovation and Access to New
Pharmaceuticals, 5 J. INT’L ECON. L. 849, 852–53 (2002).
47
See Merges & Nelson, supra note 41, at 868–69.
48
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1584.
49
See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736
(2002).
50
See id. at 736 (“[The] patent application must describe, enable, and set forth
the best mode of carrying out the invention.” (citing 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006))).
51
See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991); In re Glass,
492 F.2d 1228, 1231–32 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
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52

obtain his exclusive rights. Once an invention has been disclosed to
the Patent Office or the public, that invention becomes a part of the
53
useful arts. Accordingly, an inventor attempting to expand upon his
earlier disclosure may no longer be awarded exclusive rights to his
invention if his subsequent claim is merely a knock-off of his earlier
54
one.
Overall, each separate requirement for a patent must further the
goal of promoting progress in the useful arts. This was the goal of
55
the first Patent Act and continues to be the goal today. As the Ariad
case demonstrates, the written description requirement is essential to
56
promoting that goal. As the court explained, courts have used the
requirement since its creation to ensure that an inventor actually
invented what he originally claimed, while also encouraging inventors
to fully describe their invention so that others could use that
57
knowledge to innovate. The requirement maintains the “quid pro
quo in which the public is given meaningful disclosure in exchange
for being excluded from practicing the invention for a limited period
58
of time.” This is as true today in Ariad as it was when the original
Patent Act was passed in 1790.
B. History of Written Description
The written description requirement for patents issued in the
United States is found under 35 U.S.C. § 112, which states, “The
specification shall contain a written description of the
59
invention . . . .” Since the original Patent Act of 1790, the written
description requirement has been used to provide the public with
notice of the scope of an inventor’s “exclusive rights” (i.e., the patent
60
that an inventor is claiming). Through a written description, an
inventor both shows that his invention is in fact an invention—
52

Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d 1555. A patent may, at times, be expanded upon a reissue.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 251–255 (2006).
53
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 112 (2006); Merges & Nelson, supra note 41, at 844–
45.
54
Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d 1555.
55
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, §§ 1–7, 1 Stat. 109 (“An Act to promote the progress
of Useful Arts.”).
56
See discussion infra Part V.
57
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350–52 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
58
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(quoting Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2002))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see Schroeder, supra note 20, at 104.
59
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1344.
60
See Mueller, supra note 1, at 619–20.
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describing how the invention is different from anything already
known—and puts the public ‘“in possession’ of the boundaries of a
patentee’s asserted monopoly” so that it can avoid infringing on the
61
patent.
The Supreme Court provided an interpretation of the written
62
description requirement in 1822 in Evans v. Eaton. The primary
issue in Evans was whether the defendant infringed on the plaintiff’s
63
patent for an improved “hopperboy.” The plaintiff claimed as his
invention “the peculiar properties or principles which this machine
possesses, in the spreading, turning, and gathering the meal at one
operation, and the rising and lowering of its arms by its motion, to
64
accommodate itself to any quantity of meal it has to operate upon.”
In his claim, the plaintiff did not disclose “any distinct
65
improvement.” Even if the plaintiff had in fact created a patentable
invention, the Court invalidated the patent for failure to satisfy the
66
written description requirement. The Court explained the purpose
of the written description requirement:
[To] put the public in possession of what the party claims as his
own invention, so as to ascertain if he claims anything that is in
common use, or is already known, and to guard against prejudice
or injury from the use of an invention which the party may
otherwise innocently suppose not to be patented.67

The Court also noted that the written description was necessary to
prevent patentees from claiming patents “broader than [their]
68
invention.” The Evans case continues to be an important guideline
69
for modern application the written description requirement.
The Evans interpretation is still relevant because the language of
the written description requirement has remained essentially the
same since the first Patent Act in 1790 even though the current
language more closely resembles the language in the Patent Act of

61

Id. at 619 (quoting Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822)).
Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356.
63
Id. at 424. The “hopperboy” was a “mechanical device used to stir and cool
flour prior to its packing.” Mueller, supra note 1, at 618–19 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
64
Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 428.
65
Id. at 433.
66
Id. at 435.
67
Id. at 434.
68
Id. at 430.
69
See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2010)
(citing Evans, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) at 433–34).
62
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70

1836.
Although the initial purpose of the written description
requirement seems relatively straightforward, the Patent Act of 1870
71
seemed to diminish the role of the written description. The 1870
72
Act added the statutory requirement for the modern “claims.”
While the written description language still remains, its purpose of
specifically describing the scope of the invention can appear
redundant in light of the newly enacted requirement to “particularly
73
point out and distinctly claim” the invention. Despite this apparent
redundancy, the written description requirement still serves its
purpose of rejecting inadequate original claims and also invalidating
amended claims that subsequently add “new matter” to the originally
74
claimed invention.
The written description requirement applies to an inventor’s
claimed invention on the date that the inventor files the application
75
for a patent. The inventor’s initial patent application must allow a
person having ordinary skill in the art to know that the inventor has
“possession” of his claimed invention on the day he files his patent
76
application. This original written description becomes the basis for
subsequent amendments or alterations to the original patent
77
application. An inventor may amend his originally claimed patent
70

See Upadhyaya, supra note 7, at 69 n.34 (quoting In re Barker, 559 F.2d 588, 593
(C.C.P.A. 1977); see also Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (stating that an
inventor “shall deliver a written description of his invention or discover, and of the
manner and process of making, constructing, using, and compounding the same”).
71
See Mueller, supra note 1, at 620.
72
See id.; see also Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, §26, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (noting that
before an inventor may receive a patent he must “particularly point out and distinctly
claim the part, improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention or
discovery; and said specification and claim shall be signed by the inventor”) (emphasis
added); Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 379 (1996) (“Claim
practice did not achieve statutory recognition until the passage of the Act of 1836 . . .
and . . . did not become a statutory requirement until 1870.”). The statute notes
both a specification and a claim in the margin. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16
Stat. 198, 201. The previous Act of 1836 noted: “[A]nd in the case of any machine
[the inventor] shall particularly specify and point out the part, improvement, or
combination, which he claims as his own invention or discovery.” Patent Act of 1836,
ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119. The statute only notes specification in the margin. Id.
73
Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198, 201; see also Mueller, supra note
1, at 620.
74
Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1565 (Fed Cir. 1991); see also
Cantor, supra note 6, at 296–97; Upadhyaya, supra note 7, at 71.
75
See Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563–64; Cantor, supra note 6, at 296.
76
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 356 (1822).
77
See, e.g., Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d 1555; Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 601
F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 251 (2006); Burk & Lemley,
supra note 22, at 1652–53.
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in a couple of different ways. For one, after a patentee files an
application for a patent, he may subsequently amend his patent
78
through a continuation application.
The continuation, however,
may not include new matter that was not found in the original written
79
description. Additionally, an inventor can surrender and amend a
“defective” patent if the inventor inadvertently, through the
specification, claimed more or less than he had a right to patent or
80
made an error in his specification. The amendment, or “reissue,”
may broaden the scope of a patent as long as it is within two years of
81
the issuance of the initial patent. The reissue, however, may not
82
introduce new matter to the application for reissue. Accordingly,
the scope of the original patent application—the written
description—is essential to inventors seeking to clarify their original
claims.
In recent years, the CAFC has used the written description
requirement to police abuse of the amendment process and to
determine whether to award priority to an earlier invention date over
83
subsequent amendments.
The seminal case in which the CAFC
applied the written description requirement to subsequent patent
84
In Vas-Cath, the inventor
applications is Vas-Cath v. Mahurkar.
initially filed a “design application” disclosing a drawing of his
invention, which was included in a subsequent filing that provided a
85
more detailed description of the initial drawing. The court held
that the written description requirement is satisfied if the original
application “convey[s] with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the
art” that the inventor “was in possession of the invention,” the
86
invention being “whatever is now claimed.”
While this description
does not have to be exact, it should not be so broad as to cover

78
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 119, 120 (2006); 37 C.F.R. § 1.114 (2011). An inventor who is
successfully granted a continuation may claim the original filing date of his invention
as his invention date. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006).
79
35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006); see also Gentry Gallery Inc., v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d
1473, 1479–80 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a
Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and its Progeny in the
Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 6 (2007).
80
Id. § 251. The error cannot be purposeful or deceptive. Id.; see also Cantor,
supra note 6, at 296.
81
§ 251.
82
Id.
83
See, e.g., Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563–64.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 1558–59.
86
Id. at 1563–64.
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inventions the inventor did not in fact invent.
While Vas-Cath
focused on subsequent amendments to a claim, the Supreme Court
has noted that a claim can still be invalid if the inventor cannot show
88
he possessed the claimed invention at the time of filing.
The Supreme Court highlighted the limits of a broad patent
89
claim in the pre-1870 case O’Reilly v. Morse. Morse, the pioneer of
the telegraph, the invention at issue in the case, attempted to extend
his claim to include every possible improvement that used electric or
90
galvanic current in a similar fashion to his telegraph system.
Specifically, in his eighth claim, Morse boldly stated:
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery, or parts
of machinery, described in the foregoing specifications and
claims; the essence of my invention being the use of the motive
power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call electromagnetism, however developed, for making or printing
intelligible characters, letters, or signs, at any distances, being a
new application of that power, of which I claim to be the first
91
inventor or discovered.

The Court made it clear that while Morse discovered an
incredibly useful and novel invention, he had not discovered that the
electric or galvanic current would always have the exact same effect
92
no matter what machinery was used.
Specific and complex
machinery were required to produce the effect that Morse was
93
claiming. Morse had thus not invented or “discovered” additional
uses of electric or galvanic current beyond the method and
94
machinery described in his claim. The Court made it clear that
allowing such a broad patent would stifle further discoveries that
95
were certainly not part of Morse’s original claim. The Court further
explained that if it allowed the eighth claim, no specification would
be needed beyond a statement that by using X (electro-magnetism),
96
one can accomplish Y (print intelligible characters at a distance).

87
88

Id. at 1563.
See supra text accompanying notes 62–69 & infra text accompanying notes 89–

96.
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
Id. at 112.
Id.
Id. at 117.
Id.
Id.
Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 113.
Id. at 119.
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In 1967, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), the
predecessor to the CAFC, reaffirmed the use of the written
97
description requirement to invalidate original claims. The case, In
re Ruschig, dealt with the sole issue of whether the patent applicant’s
98
claim was “supported by the disclosure of [applicant’s] application.”
In his claims, the patent applicant disclosed a number of different
99
chemical reagents. The applicant then attempted to claim that he
100
had disclosed a particular chemical compound, chlorpropamide.
The applicant believed that he was entitled to claim chlorpropamide
because the compound could be created through a combination of
three of the reagents listed in the claim and because he had disclosed
101
a number of specific compounds that the reagents could create.
The judge, however, noted that the listed reagents could “encompass
102
something like half a million possible compounds.”
The
compounds that the applicant listed provided no particular guidance
103
or description of the creation of chlorpropamide.
Analyzing the
claim as a question of fact, the court held that the claim did not
104
disclose chlorpropamide. Nothing in the claim, other than a list of
different compounds, indicated that the applicant had actually
105
invented chlorpropamide.
Applying the written description
requirement, the court essentially found that the applicant was not
entitled to the broad patent he claimed merely because he disclosed
the elements necessary to achieve a particular result—the creation of
106
chlorpropamide. The patentee must show that he has possession of
the specific invention—the species—that he is claiming, or for a
107
broad patent, he must show that he has possession of the genus.
The CCPA’s holding in In re Ruschig reaffirmed the use of the written
description requirement as a method to invalidate original claims.
97

See In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Upadhyaya, supra note 7, at 72.
In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 991.
99
Id. at 993.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 994–96.
104
In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 995–96.
105
Id. at 995.
106
Id. at 995–96.
107
Alison Aubrey Richards, Ariad v. Eli Lilly—The Federal Circuit Confirms the
Written Description Requirement, SOFTEC (Oct. 6, 2010, 10:30 AM),
http://www.softec.org/blogs/business_and_technology_law/archive/2010/10/
06/ariad-v-eli-lilly-the-federal-circuit-confirms-the-written-descriptionrequirement.aspx.
98
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C. Modern Use of Written Description in the CAFC
In more recent years, the CAFC has continuously used the
written description requirement to invalidate original claims. Regents
108
of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Co. (“Lilly”), heard before a
panel of the CAFC, is one of the more significant cases applying the
109
written description to modern patents.
The plaintiffs in Lilly
discovered the gene sequence that allowed the production of rat
110
insulin.
Insulin is commonly used to treat people afflicted with
111
The claims at issue claimed broad categories including
diabetes.
the genetic code to “vertebrates” and “mammalian and human
112
insulin.”
The CAFC held the broad claims invalid for failure to
113
satisfy the written description.
In its reasoning, the court cited
plaintiff’s failure to precisely describe the broad class of “vertebrate
114
But
or mammalian insulin cDNA” that the plaintiff was claiming.
because the rat DNA sequence was merely one species of a broader
genus of claims that include all vertebrate DNA, the discovery and
recitation of the rat insulin code did not sufficiently describe the
115
other sequences that plaintiff attempted to claim.
Distinguishing the written description from other patentability
doctrines, the court noted that with the rat DNA sequence, a person
of ordinary skill in the art could eventually discover the human
116
sequence. Thus, even if the description rendered the broad claims
117
118
obvious, the written description was not necessarily satisfied. The
court held, “[b]ecause the . . . specification provides only a general
method of producing human insulin cDNA and a description of the
human insulin A and B chain amino acid sequences that cDNA
encodes, it does not provide a written description of human insulin
119
cDNA.” The panel decision in Lilly regarding the use of the written

108

119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
See Kelly, supra note 7; Upadhyaya, supra note 7. But see Dennis Crouch, An
Empirical Study of the Role of the Written Description Requirement in Patent Examination, 104
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 382, 393–94 (2010); Holman, supra note 79, at 4–5.
110
Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1562–63.
111
Id. at 1562.
112
Id. at 1563.
113
Id. at 1568.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 1568.
116
Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567.
117
See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
118
Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567.
119
Id. (emphasis added).
109
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description requirement to invalidate original claims sparked
significant controversy and dissent among legal commentators and
the CAFC itself, setting the stage for a rehearing on the issue before
120
the entire CAFC.
D. Enablement
As noted, the first paragraph of § 112 contains another major
requirement separate from the written description: enablement. The
relevant statutory text states:
The specification shall contain . . . [a written description] of the
manner and process of making and using [the invention], in such
full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled
in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
121
connected, to make and use the same . . . .

Unlike the written description requirement, which is a question of
122
123
fact, the enablement requirement is a question of law.
The
enablement requirement, like the written description requirement, is
124
used to limit the scope of a patent. Enablement asks if a person of
ordinary skill in the art could, at the time of filing, make and use the
125
patentee’s claimed invention without “undue experimentation.”
Further, enablement does not specifically ask what the invention is or
what the inventor invented; it merely asks if one of ordinary skill in
126
the art could make the invention having read the specification.
Simply put, enablement focuses on what others can accomplish given
120

See, e.g., Holman, supra note 109 at 17–18.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (emphasis added).
122
See, e.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
123
See Cantor, supra note 6, at 283. Essentially, the written description
requirement requires a factual determination of whether the specification itself
demonstrates to a person of ordinary skill in the art that the inventor possessed the
actual invention. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352. Enablement, on the other hand, looks to
whether certain information, which is necessary to the make and use of the
invention, existed on the date that applicant filed for a patent. See, e.g., In re Glass,
492 F.2d 1228, 1231–32 (C.C.P.A. 1974); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
124
See Cantor, supra note 7, at 283–84.
125
Id. When considering “undue experimentation,” courts look to a number of
factors. Id. As articulated in In re Wands, these factors include: “(1) the quantity of
experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, (3)
the presence or absence of working examples, (4) the nature of the invention, (5)
the state of the prior art, (6) the relative skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability
or unpredictability of the art, and (8) the breadth of the claims.” Wands, 858 F.2d at
736; see also infra Part III (discussing unpredictability in biotechnology).
126
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1649.
121
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a description of the invention (i.e., “can you make X”), while the
written description requirement focuses on what the inventor actually
disclosed (i.e., “what is X”). The scope of what another can make
given an inventor’s disclosure may not necessarily coincide with what
an inventor actually invented.
As two coexisting elements in paragraph one of § 112,
enablement and written description are so often intertwined by the
simple fact that in order to make an invention, one would almost
127
certainly need to know what the invention is. Accordingly, the two
128
requirements “often rise and fall together.” Cases like In re Ruschig,
however, show that a disclosed invention might at times enable a
person skilled in the art to make an invention even though the
129
invention is not described.
Additionally, enablement encourages
130
expansive claims that include after-arising technology.
While this
encouragement may provide a positive incentive for patent applicants
creating pioneering technologies, it also encourages inventors to
provide generalized claims that may include inventions to which the
inventors are not entitled. The written description requirement
articulated in Ariad provides a method for the courts to stop patent
applicants who attempt to misuse the patent system by over-extending
131
their claims to cover inventions that they have not yet invented.
Accordingly, investment and progress are encouraged as inventors
can be confident that the system will adequately award exclusive
rights.

127

§ 112.
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352.
129
Another example highlighted in the Ariad case is if an inventor claims a methyl
compound, but fails to disclose a propyl or butyl compound. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352
(citing In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1405 n.1 (C.C.P.A. 1971)). While the process to
make the methyl compound enables others to create the propyl and butyl
compounds, the two compounds have not been described and are thus not entitled
to a patent. Id. Accordingly, a claim should not be valid if it merely describes a
broad method, while indicating that the inventor did not possess the full scope of the
invention.
130
See, e.g., In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977). A patent will not fail
enablement merely because the state of the art or technology changes, thus enabling
“after arising” technologies that are covered by the patent but were not intended by
the initial disclosure. Id.
131
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353–54.
128
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III. BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PATENT POLICY
The patent law system is designed to “promote innovation by
132
granting exclusive rights to encourage invention.”
In order to
accomplish this goal, the system must provide inventors with
exclusive rights to their inventions as a reward for the time and
money that they invested in the difficult work of invention, and at the
133
same time, avoid stifling innovation by granting overbroad patents.
The biotechnology industry in particular requires careful analysis
when granting patents due to both the nature of the science—the
focus of this Comment—and also the ethical issues that arise with
134
biotechnology.
A. The Biotechnology Industry and Patents
Biotechnology has been described as “any technique that uses
living organisms or substances from these organisms to make or
modify a product, to improve plants or animals, or to develop
135
microorganisms for specific uses.”
The broad array of modern
biotechnology patents has largely been encouraged since the 1980
136
Supreme Court case Diamond v. Chakrabarty.
In Chakrabarty, the
Supreme Court examined a patent concerning genetically modified
137
bacteria. The Court held that the bacteria were patentable, noting
that patentable subject matter included “anything under the sun that
is made by man” and that “Congress plainly contemplated that the
138
patent laws would be given wide scope.”
The biotechnology
products that are of primary concern to critics of Ariad generally
include manipulations of genetic material, proteins, hormones,
132
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353–54; Burk & Lemley,
supra note 22, at 1580.
133
See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353–54; Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1580–81;
Cantor supra note 6, at 268.
134
Cantor, supra note 6, at 268.
135
Sandra Schmieder, Scope of Biotechnology Inventions in the United States and in
Europe—Compulsory Licensing, Experimental Use and Arbitration: A Study of Patentability of
DNA-Related Inventions with Special Emphasis on the Establishment of an Arbitration Based
Compulsory Licensing System, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 163, 171
(2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Linda R. Judge, Biotechnology:
Highlights of the Science and Law Shaping the Industry, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 79, 79 (2004) (noting that biotechnology includes “the use of living
organisms or their products to modify human health and/or the human
environment typically by using the techniques of gene splicing and recombinant
DNA technology”).
136
447 U.S. 309 (1980); see also Schmieder, supra note 135, at 84.
137
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
138
Id. at 308–09.
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genetic sequences, and chemical processes that eventually result in
therapeutic treatments—more specifically, biopharmaceutical
139
products. Resulting products and claims involve different drugs or
gene sequences that are used medicinally, as diagnostic tests, or as a
140
basis for further research.
These products inherently have a high
public demand due to the obvious social benefits (i.e., saving human
141
lives and treating thousands of health conditions) they provide.
As a whole, biotechnology involves complex physiological
142
systems that create a “high degree of uncertainty and risk.” Longterm development costs are necessary to create new products or to
143
improve upon old ones. Additionally, biotechnology can often lead
139
See Natasha N. Aljalian, The Role of Patent Scope in Biopharmaceutical Patents, 11
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 21–25 (2005); Schmieder, supra note 135, at 171–73.
140
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1676–78. Over the years, courts have
attempted to pinpoint the scope of patentable biotechnology products. For
example, prior to Chakrabarty, in In re Fischer, the CCPA examined a claim for a
complex solution containing adrenocorticotrophic hormones (ACTH). 427 F.2d
833, 834 (C.C.P.A. 1970). The solution was useful because it could be injected safely
into humans as a treatment for arthritis. Id. The court held that a description of
amino acids—sequences of DNA form corresponding amino acids—was sufficient
structural information to identify the claimed invention; however, the claim was
incomplete because it only included twenty-four of the thirty-nine amino acids
required to complete the sequence. Id. at 836. Further, the patentee attempted to
claim any ACTH solution having a potency range greater than 111%. Id. at 834. The
court held that the scope far exceeded the inventor’s actual claim because his
solution was limited to 230%. Id. at 839.
Subsequent cases dealing with biotechnology products demanded even more
specific disclosures. See, e.g., Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 589 F.3d 1336, 1350
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that in order to claim a broad genus, an inventor must
disclose “a representative number of species falling within the scope of the genus . . .
so that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of the genus”);
Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 925 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding
that method claims involving chemicals other than DNA and RNA must also describe
actual compounds and sufficient materials that obtain the desired result, thus
outlining the scope of the claimed invention); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566–67 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that a method for preparing a
sequence of DNA or the corresponding amino acid sequence does not sufficiently
describe the scope of a claim under § 112 and noting that such claims “require a
precise definition, such as by structure, formula, chemical name, or physical
properties”); Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1170–71 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding that an
adequate written description of DNA requires a disclosure of the DNA sequence and
not merely the corresponding mRNA reference from which the DNA sequence could
be obtained); Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213–14 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (holding that the inventor could not claim all genetic sequences that
produced EPO-like (a hormone) activity merely by disclosing “the gene and a
handful of analogs whose activity has not been clearly ascertained”).
141
See Schmieder, supra note 135, at 178.
142
Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1676.
143
Id.
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to unforeseeable functions and research results with any product,
even if that product has been available and improved upon for many
144
years. Further, because much of the technology involves testing on
human patients and high-risk consequences to consumers, the
145
industry is heavily regulated.
Accordingly, the costs and risks
associated with creating biotechnology products are enormous.
For example, in its amicus brief in Ariad on behalf of Eli Lilly,
Amgen Inc., a pioneer in the biotechnology industry, discussed the
146
difficulties of producing biotechnology products.
Amgen
explained that costs for research and development “for each
successful therapeutic product” average between “$800 million to
$1.2 billion” and that such products typically take over ten years to
147
develop.
Further, “only five out of 250 products ever make it to
human testing, and for every product that does make it to market,
148
approximately nine products fail in clinical testing.” Even still, “of
those products that make it to market, only about 20% ever recoup
149
Additionally, the relative ease of
the average investment cost.”
creating a generic follow-on product that avoids the risk, uncertainty,
and many other complications associated with creating biotechnology
drugs leaves innovators of these products in a position in which they
require strong patent protection in order to make their investment
150
worthwhile.
B. Bayh-Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts
The most important influence on the growth of the
151
biotechnology industry was the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.
In fact,
some believe the Act to be “possibly the most inspired piece of

144

Id.
Id. See, e.g., Drug Price Competition & Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 271(e), 156 (2006)
and 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2006)).
146
Brief for Amgen, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 1, 13–15,
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (No. 02-CV11280).
147
Id. at 13–14.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 15.
150
See Burk and Lemley, supra note 22, at 1677.
151
35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006); see also Heather Hamme Ramirez, Comment,
Defending the Privatization of Research Tools: An Examination of the “Tragedy of the
Anticommons” in Biotechnology Research and Development, 53 EMORY L.J. 359, 364–65
(2004).
145
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legislation to be enacted in America over the past half-century.”
The Act’s primary purpose was to use the patent system to promote
collaboration between federally funded research institutions and
private industry, which was designed to further overall biotechnology
153
innovation. Bayh-Dole encouraged innovation by (i) ensuring that
“private parties contributing to publicly funded research would retain
the right to develop any subsequent inventions,” (ii) motivating the
“employees of government-owned, government operated laboratories
to make and license commercializable inventions,” and (iii) “favoring
American over foreign industry in conferring ownership rights to
154
publicly funded technology.”
Essentially, government-subsidized
research institutions were allowed to retain patents, unlike the
previous framework, in which such patents became the property of
155
the government.
The Bayh-Dole Act worked in conjunction with
156
the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980.
The
Stevenson-Wydler Act explained the potential for scientific progress
through cooperative research, noting how discoveries were occurring
in university and federal laboratories, but were being implemented
157
for public and commercial use through private industry. Thus, the
152
Editorial, Innovation’s Golden Goose, 365 ECONOMIST 3, 3 (2002), available at
http://www.economist.com/node/1476653.
153
According to Congress:
It is the policy and objective of the Congress to use the patent system to
promote the utilization of inventions arising from federally supported
research or development; to encourage maximum participation of
small business firms in federally supported research and development
efforts; to promote collaboration between commercial concerns and
nonprofit organizations, including universities; to ensure that
inventions made by nonprofit organizations and small business firms
are used in a manner to promote free competition and enterprise
without unduly encumbering future research and discovery; to
promote the commercialization and public availability of inventions
made in the United States by United States industry and labor; to
ensure that the Government obtains sufficient rights in federally
supported inventions to meet the needs of the Government and
protect the public against nonuse or unreasonable use of inventions;
and to minimize the costs of administering policies in this area.
35 U.S.C. § 200 (2006); see also Dana Katz & Jon F. Merz, Patents and Licensing, Policy,
Patenting of Inventions Developed with Public Funds, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL,
LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 854, 861–62 (Thomas H. Murray &
Maxwell J. Mehlman eds., 2000); John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and
Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101,
120 (2001).
154
Id. § 200.
155
Id.
156
15 U.S.C. §§ 3701–3714 (2006).
157
§ 3701.
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Act’s main purpose was to “[renew, expand, and strengthen]”
cooperation between these public and private entities through
“technology transfer, personal exchange, joint research projects” and
158
more.
Both Acts authorized the creation of technology transfer
offices at universities, nonprofit facilities, and federally funded
research institutions that provided a mechanism for publicly funded
entities to identify and utilize technologies that have potential
159
commercial applications.
Prior to the Bayh-Dole Act, the high risk/reward ratio for
investing in biotechnology was such that few companies or
160
institutions looked at developing these products. Before the Act, a
mere five percent of discoveries that the National Institutes of Health
funded resulted in new improved products related to biotechnology
161
innovation. Within thirty years of passage, the Act has created over
162
In those
5,000 new companies based around university research.
same thirty years, these companies developed “153 new drugs,
163
vaccines or in vitro devices” that made it to the market. The BayhDole Act is credited with creating the biotechnology industry in the
United States, and has been described as “possibly the most
important piece of legislation to be enacted in America over the past
164
half century.”
Specifically, the economic growth of universities demonstrates
the effects of the Bayh-Dole Act. In 1997, universities accounted for
almost $500 million in biotechnology proceeds from their own
165
166
patents.
That number went to almost $1 billion by 2002.
Additionally, as of 1981, universities had 436 biotechnology patents,

158

§ 3701; see also § 3702.
Id. § 3710; 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
160
See
Phyllis
Gardner
Testimony,
BIO
(July
10,
2002),
http://www3.bio.org/ip/action/tt20030710.asp.
161
Id. The National Institutes of Health, the top medical research agency in the
United States, is “the largest source of funding for medical research in the world.”
NAT’L INSTS. HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/index.html (last visited June 10,
2012).
162
Thirty Years After Passage, Bayh-Dole Act Drives the Economy, Protects Public Health,
NEWSWISE (May 3, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.newswise.com/articles/thirty-yearsafter-passage-bayh-dole-act-drives-the-economy-protects-public-health.
163
Id.
164
Id.; Chester G. Moore, Comment, Killing the Bayh-Dole Act’s Golden Goose, 8 TUL.
J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 151, 152 (quoting Innovation’s Golden Goose, supra note 152,
at 3).
165
See Rowe, supra note 26, at 295.
166
Id.
159
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while in 2001 they had nearly 3,203.
As a whole, biotech patents
168
increased from 18,695 in 1996 to 47,473 in 2002, a 154% increase.
Even in recent years, startup investment and new product
development through technology transfers remains high. In 2008
and 2009 combined, as a result of university research, 1,306 new
commercial products were introduced and 1,196 new companies
169
were formed.
Overall investment has also been consistently high,
with sponsored research expenditures totaling $111.37 billion over
170
In 2009 alone, the total licensing income
the same two years.
171
through technology transfer offices totaled $2.3 billion.
Notwithstanding this tremendous success, the Bayh-Dole Act is
not without its critics and its problems. The quick expansion of the
biotechnology industry, coupled with the granting of broad patents
for biotechnology inventions and research tools, has created concern
172
regarding downstream biotechnology research.
Future products
often require the use of a combination of many different previously
173
patented products. If a patentee holding a broad or crucial patent
refuses to license his invention, or if the cost of licensing is
prohibitively expensive, future inventors will be unable to perform
even the basic research necessary to create additional improvements
174
in the field.
Even when an inventor is able to purchase the
necessary licenses, research costs begin to increase significantly with
175
each additional product purchase.
With each subsequent
innovation, inventors must charge higher prices for their own

167

Id.
See Schmieder, supra note 135, at 177.
169
Press Release, Ass’n of Univ. Tech. Managers, AUTM U.S. Licensing Activity
Survey
Summary:
FY2009
(2009),
available
at
http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Documents&Template=/CM/Co
ntentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=5237; Press Release, Ass’n of Univ. Tech. Managers,
AUTM U.S. Licensing Activity Survey Summary: FY2008 (2008) [hereinafter AUTM
2008],
available
at
http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Licensing_Surveys_AUTM&CON
TENTID=4513&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm [hereinafter AUTM 2009].
170
AUTM 2008, supra note 169; AUTM 2009, supra note 169.
171
AUTM 2009, supra note 169.
172
See, e.g., Natalie M. Derzko, In Search of a Compromised Solution to the Problem
Arising from Patenting Biomedical Research Tools, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 347 (2004). Research tools are devices or products that are necessary to
perform basic research. Id. at 348.
173
Moore, supra note 164, at 154.
174
Derzko, supra note 172, at 348; see also infra notes 323–40 and accompanying
text.
175
Moore, supra note 164, at 155.
168
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176

products in order to recover the costs spent on obtaining licenses.
This increased cost is eventually transferred to the average
177
consumer.
In addition to rising costs, some argue that allowing
federally funded research institutions to gain patent protection
178
essentially translates to a government giveaway. Patents that would
normally be owned by the government would now belong to private
179
industries and the research institutions themselves.
Overall, the Bayh-Dole Act as a whole was a fundamental shift in
the incentive structure for research and development at federally
180
funded institutions.
Providing universities and other federally
funded institutions with access to the patent system gave commercial
investors a financial incentive to tap into the facilities where a
181
significant amount of research was already being performed.
Consequently, the growth of the U.S. biotechnology industry can be
182
directly tied to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act.
The Act led to a tremendous increase in private investment in
183
As
universities and, in turn, to great progress in innovation.
universities began to profit from investment and patent protection,
however, concerns arose regarding patent infringement by
institutions that were no longer protected by the experimental use
184
doctrine.
Under this doctrine, researchers could use patented
devices in their research without becoming susceptible to an
infringement suit as long as the research was merely philosophical
185
curiosity as opposed to motivated by profit. Once universities were
able to gain patent protection, research that led to profit became
186
more commonplace.
Particularly, in a 1984 case involving
biopharmaceutical products, the CAFC severely restricted the
experimental use exception, holding that entities developing generic
versions of patented products while the patent was still in force no
176

See Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1611–13
Id.
178
Moore, supra note 164, at 154.
179
Id.
180
See Sara Boettiger and Alan B. Bennett, Bayh-Dole: If We Knew Then What We
Know Now, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY, 320–23 (2006).
181
Id.; see also 32 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2006).
182
See Boettiger, supra note 179, at 320–23; see also §§ 200–212.
183
Rowe, supra note 26, at 295–97.
184
See id. at 290.
185
Id. at 284. There is also an experimental use exception involving “use” under.
Id. § 102(b). This paper focuses on the experimental use “research” exception as
codified under § 271(e). See infra notes 189–205 and accompanying text.
186
See Rowe, supra note 26, at 290.
177
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longer fit under the exception.
Continuing to pursue the overall
goal of promoting private-public collaboration in biotech research,
Congress’ responded swiftly to the CAFC’s holding by passing the
188
Hatch-Waxman Act that same year.
The Hatch-Waxman Act provided another huge boost to
biotechnology innovation and collaborative research by codifying an
experimental use research exception against infringement claims for
189
those developing biopharmaceutical products.
As a trade-off,
inventors received longer exclusivity periods while generic product
developers and researchers were free to use the patented inventions
190
during the course of the patent life. Working in conjunction with
the Act’s abbreviated new drug application (ANDA) process,
researchers could, without infringing, perform the necessary testing
for FDA approval of their generic products while the corresponding
191
original product was still under patent protection.
As a result of
Hatch-Waxman, generic products were ready to hit the market as
192
soon as the originator’s patent expired.
Under the Hatch-Waxman and Bayh-Dole Acts, private investors
have tremendous financial incentives to collaborate with universities
and other research institutions. Since Congress passed these Acts,
academic institutions that previously relied almost entirely on federal
funding are now able to transfer much of their biopharmaceutical
193
research focus to industry-driven research.
As non-profit
187

Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Rowe,
supra note 26, at 290.
188
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355
(2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271(2000)).
189
Section 271(e) of Title 35 states
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
within the United States or import into the United States a patented
invention (other than a new animal drug or veterinary biological
product . . . which is primarily manufactured using recombinant DNA,
recombinant RNA, hybridoma technology, or other processes involving
site specific genetic manipulation techniques) solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information
under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of
drugs or veterinary biological products.
35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2006). Subsequent case law extended the exception to medical
devices. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
190
Rowe, supra note 26, at 293–94.
191
Id. at 294.
192
Id.
193
See Michael D. Witt & Susan K. Lehnhardt, Transferring Innovations from
Academic Research Institutions to Industry: Overview, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL,
LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, supra note 153, at 1081, 1082.
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institutions, academic research centers have traditionally pursued
194
educational and basic research. As federal support for research has
195
decreased, the private-public collaborative effort has grown.
Consequently, universities are encouraged to target commercializable
196
products over purely philosophical endeavors.
The pursuit of
profit, however, might occasionally seem in conflict with an academic
institution’s mission to further progress and learning if the institution
decides to focus on pure money-making projects instead of
197
groundbreaking high-risk research.
Accordingly, private gain can
at times work against the greater good of creating useful
198
technologies.
Conversely, pursuing private gain also encourages
the pursuit of products that might actually become available to the
199
To balance these
public as opposed to less productive research.
conflicting policies, universities must have incentives to pursue
practical research and, at the same time, incentives to pursue
groundbreaking research at the cost of profit. At the same time there
must also be a balance between the incentives awarded to universities
200
and the industry’s ability to continually invest and compete.
The experimental use exception provides an important
incentive for universities to continue to improve the progress in an
area of biopharmaceutical research. The CAFC at times, however,
appears to be at odds with the congressional intent to encourage
private-public collaboration through the exception. In Merck KGaA v.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., the Supreme Court bolstered the HatchWaxman research exception, overturning the CAFC’s narrow
201
reading.
The Court interpreted § 271(e) as encompassing all
research that is “reasonably related” to possible submissions under
202
federal law and not merely research for generic products.
In
another CAFC case, Madey v. Duke University, the court essentially
194

Id.
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 1082–83.
198
Id.
199
Witt & Lehnhardt, supra note 193, at 1082–83.
200
See infra notes 333–47 and accompanying text.
201
545 U.S. 193 (2005); see Rowe, supra note 26, at 295. The CAFC would have
excluded “(1) experimentation on drugs that are not ultimately the subject of an
FDA submission or (2) use of patented compounds in experiments that are not
ultimately submitted to the FDA” from the § 271(e) safe harbor. Merck, 545 U.S. at
206. Effectively, the CAFC wanted to limit § 271 safe harbor to only generic
products. Id.
202
Merck, 545 U.S. at 206–07.
195
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eliminated the common law experimental use exception for
203
academic and other non-profit institutions.
The court held that
even though universities often promote research projects that have
“arguably no commercial application whatsoever,” these projects still
“further the institution’s legitimate business objectives” through
reputational benefits, the lure of research grants, and additional
204
students and faculty. Accordingly, academic institutions will rarely
satisfy the experimental use exception unless they are performing §
205
271(e) biopharmaceutical research.
In light of these two cases,
biopharmaceutical research provides a unique investment
opportunity for private investors looking to tap into academic
research institutions.
Overall, Bayh-Dole and Hatch-Waxman have fostered privatepublic collaboration. In general, however, the goals of private
industry are to seek a profit, while the goals of university research are
primarily to promote the pursuit of educational interests and high206
cost groundbreaking research.
Accordingly, even though BayhDole and Hatch-Waxman have largely been positive for
biotechnology innovation, a significant imbalance occurs between the
two sides if universities performing research are awarded too much
protection against infringement and are granted broad patents for
207
basic research. Furthering the imbalance, universities rarely attack
208
each other’s patents or research. A possible indicator of a growing
imbalance is the fact that universities have begun winning large
infringement suits against commercial companies in the
209
pharmaceutical industry.
If universities receive broad patents for
basic research, the biotechnology industry would likely face
significant hurdles to its own research due to increased costs to either
203
307 F.3d 1351 (2002). The Madey case was an infringement action brought by
Professor Madey, a former professor at Duke. Id. at 1361–62. The CAFC found
Duke liable for using Madey’s laser once Madey was no longer at Duke. Id.
204
Id. at 1362.
205
Rowe, supra note 26, at 293.
206
Witt & Lehnhardt, supra note 193, at 1082.
207
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1611–13.
208
See Rowe, supra note 26, at 301–04. Rowe notes that universities have little to
gain by suing each other and much to lose. Id. at 298. A suit will fail if the infringing
university is working purely for research and public universities have certain
immunities from infringement suits altogether. Id. at 304 (citing Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647–48 (1999)).
Further, suing another university brings bad publicity and discourages collaborative
projects with the attacking university and others, including the commercial industry.
Id. at 303–04.
209
See Rowe, supra note 27, at 301–04.
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obtain licenses or settle infringement suits with universities.
Additionally, as basic research in particular is difficult to discover
until disclosed, companies would have an even more difficult time
211
knowing what patent they may have infringed upon.
If the industry as a whole is to maintain its success, courts must
find ways to preserve the balance between public and private research
entities and limit the negative impact of broad biotechnology patents
within the current system. The Ariad decision and the court’s
modern application of the written description requirement exemplify
212
the CAFC’s willingness to directly address these issues.
The Ariad
case involved a number of extremely broad method claims included
in a patent owned jointly by university researchers and the biotech
213
company Ariad Pharmaceuticals.
Overall, the discovery was
214
groundbreaking and tremendously helpful to other researchers.
The claims at issue, however, were more of a prediction of where the
215
technology would progress as opposed to an actual product.
In Ariad, the CAFC recognized that in unpredictable fields like
biotechnology, improperly granted overbroad patents are of
216
particular concern, and thus a high level of scrutiny is required.
Requirements that rely on the level of technology in the field,
enablement in particular, may not catch every improper broad
patent. The CAFC thus used the written description requirement to
simplify its inquiry. Because Ariad did not include enough specific
examples to identify its broad claims, the claims were invalid for
217
failure to satisfy the written description requirement.
If privatepublic collaboration is to be encouraged, and the congressional
intent of the Bayh-Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts furthered, there
must be greater protection for entities that are able to fully invest in
218
developing a finalized product. Following the trend dating back to
Evans, Morse, and the more recent Lilly decision, the CAFC in Ariad
used the written description requirement as a separate and distinct
inquiry from the enablement requirement to provide this additional
210

Id. at 301.
Id. at 309.
212
See Ariad Pharm., Inc., v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1358–60 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (Newman, J., concurring).
213
See infra notes 228–31 and accompanying text.
214
See infra notes 232–38 and accompanying text.
215
See infra notes 236–48 and accompanying text.
216
See infra notes 278–99 and accompanying text.
217
See infra note 255 and accompanying text.
218
See discussion infra Part V.
211
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protection.
In order to fully understand how this requirement
provides the necessary protection, the following section provides an
in-depth look into the Ariad case. The following part looks at the
CAFC’s justifications for its holding and discusses why the court’s use
of the written description requirement was appropriate. Further, it
discusses how the opinion specifically applies to certain
biotechnology claims.
IV. ARIAD V. ELI LILLY
In order to manage the problematic rise in overbroad patents in
biotechnology, the CAFC in Ariad reemphasized the need for a
separate and distinct written description requirement as applied to
220
original claims.
Thirteen years after the court’s controversial
reassertion of the requirement in Lilly, the CAFC finally weighed in
en banc on the separate purpose and scope of the written description
requirement. In Ariad, the court analyzed two key issues: “(1)
[w]hether 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, contains a written
description requirement separate from an enablement requirement”
and “(2) [i]f a separate written description requirement is set forth in
221
the statute, what is the scope and purpose of that requirement.”
The court came to the ultimate conclusion that the written
description requirement is a separate and distinct requirement for
patentability and that when claiming a broad generic invention, an
inventor must show he has invented a sufficient number of species to
222
support a broader claim.
The Ariad case involved an allegation of patent infringement of
U.S. patent 6,410,516 by, among other parties, Ariad
223
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., against Eli Lilly & Company. Ariad originally
sued in the United States District Court for the District of
224
Massachusetts.
At trial, a jury found infringement and did not
225
On appeal, a
invalidate any of the asserted claims in the patent.
panel of CAFC judges “reversed the district court’s denial of Lilly’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law and held the asserted claims

219

Ariad Pharm., Inc., v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1336.
221
Id. at 1342.
222
Id. at 1349.
223
Id. at 1340.
224
Id.; see Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 529 F. Supp. 2d 106, 112 (D. Mass.
2007).
225
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340.
220
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226

invalid for lack of written description.”
The CAFC then accepted
Ariad’s petition for a rehearing en banc regarding the interpretation
227
of § 112 and the written description requirement.
Ariad alleged that two of Eli Lilly’s “pharmaceutical products”
228
infringed on several claims in Ariad’s patent. The overall scope of
the claims effectively included “the desired result of reducing the
binding of NF-K[B] to NF-[K]B recognition sites” without specific
229
examples as to how this reduction was to be accomplished.
NF230
231
[K]B is an inactive protein found in many different cell types. If
NF-[K]B is activated through external stimuli, including diseases like
cancer and AIDS, it travels and binds to other cells causing the cells
232
to create proteins that help them survive against the infection.
While the NF-[K]B’s primary purpose appears to be beneficial, the

226

Id.
Id.
228
Id. The claims were as follows:
80. [A method for modifying effects of external influences on a
eukaryotic cell, which external influences induce NF-[K]B-mediated
intracellular signaling, the method comprising altering NF-[K]B
activity in the cells such that NF-[K]B-mediated effects of external
influences are modified, wherein NF-[K]B activity in the cell is
reduced] wherein reducing NF-[K]B activity comprises reducing
binding of NF-[K]B to NF-[K]B recognition sites on genes which are
transcriptionally
regulated
by
NF-[K]B.
95. [A method for reducing, in eukaryotic cells, the level of expression
of genes which are activated by extracellular influences which induce
NF-[K]B-mediated intracellular signaling, the method comprising
reducing NF-[K]B activity in the cells such that expression of said genes
is
reduced],
carried
out
on
human
cells.
144. [A method for reducing bacterial lipopolysaccharide-induced
expression of cytokines in mammalian cells, which method comprises
reducing NF-[K]B activity in the cells so as to reduce bacterial
lipopolysaccharide-induced expression of said cytokines in the cells]
wherein reducing NF-[K]B activity comprises reducing binding of NF[K]B to NF-[K]B recognition sites on genes which are transcriptionally
regulated
by
NF-[K]B.
145. [A method for reducing bacterial lipopolysaccharide-induced
expression of cytokines in mammalian cells, which method comprises
reducing NF-[K]B activity in the cells so as to reduce bacterial
lipopolysaccharide-induced expression of said cytokines in the cells],
carried out on human cells.
Id. at 1340–41.
229
Id. at 1341; see also infra notes 236–48 and accompanying text.
230
NF-[K]B is inhibited by a specific protein, “I[K]B” or “Inhibitor of kappa B.”
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340.
231
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 529 F. Supp. 2d 106, 112 (D. Mass. 2007).
232
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
227
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protein becomes harmful to the host if it is produced in excess.
Accordingly, any method that reduced the binding of NF-[K]B to NF[K]B recognition sites, and thereby limited the production of the
activated proteins, would have “enormous and wide-ranging
234
therapeutic effects.”
Ariad was not only the first to identify NF[K]B, but also the first to discover the “mechanism” by which NF235
[K]B is activated and responds to infections.
Despite Ariad’s
breakthrough discovery, it did not, at the time of filing, discover a
specific method for achieving its desired result of reducing NF-[K]B
236
activity.
Ariad disclosed three possible molecules that could
“potentially” reduce NF-[K]B activity: specific inhibitors, dominantly
237
interfering molecules, and decoy molecules.
238
Regarding these molecules, first, Ariad listed only I-[K]B as a
specific inhibitor; however, Ariad only noted that if one of ordinary
239
skill were to isolate natural I-[K]B, he could reduce NF-[K]B.
240
Isolation of I-[K]B would require further experimentation. Ariad’s
“invitation for further research” showed that it did not have
“possession” of a method to reduce NF-[K]B through specific
241
inhibitors.
Second, Ariad failed to disclose a single “dominantly
242
Ariad also admitted that it did not
interfering molecule.”
necessarily know how to create a specific dominantly interfering
243
molecule.
Thus, Ariad was not in “possession” of the claimed
method of reducing NF-[K]B through dominantly interfering
molecules. Finally, Ariad did in fact disclose structural examples of
244
“decoy molecules.”
But, Ariad failed to describe the binding of

233

Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340.
Ariad, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 112.
235
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340.
236
See Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1355–58; supra note 10 and accompanying text.
237
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1355; see also infra notes 238–47 and accompanying text.
238
I-[K]B occurs naturally in the body and keeps NF-[K]B inactive until the cell
receives external influences, such as infections. Id. at 1356.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id. A dominantly interfering molecule is in effect part of an NF-[K]B molecule
which would bind in place of NF-[K]B but not have the negative properties of NF[K]B. Id.
243
Id.
244
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1357. Decoy molecules are different molecules from NF[K]B that would “mimic” NF-[K]B and bind in place of NF-[K]B receptors, thereby
blocking the binding of the NF-[K]B molecules themselves. Id.
234
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245

these decoy molecules or whether or not they would be effective.
After analyzing all three of Ariad’s claimed methods for reducing NF[K]B, the court concluded that the claims merely described general
molecular structures and hypothesized how they might reduce NF246
[K]B activity. Ariad’s claims, covering nearly any method to reduce
NF-[K]B, were significantly broader than anything it had disclosed,
and therefore the claims were invalid for failure to satisfy the written
247
description requirement of § 112.
Before specifically analyzing Ariad’s claims under the written
description requirement, the court first had to answer Ariad’s
assertion that the written description requirement, as articulated by
248
the CAFC, was not separate from the enablement requirement.
The court would then have to establish the scope of the written
description requirement before going forward with analyzing the
249
claims themselves.
To address the first issue, the court looked to
the language of § 112, Supreme Court precedent, stare decisis, the
250
CCPA case In re Ruschig, the application of the written description
251
requirement to original claims, and finally, to its own precedent.
First, the CAFC looked to the language of § 112 to determine
the meaning of the written description requirement as separate from
252
the enablement requirement.
Again, the relevant statutory text is
as follows:
The specification shall contain a written description of the
invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it,
in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any
person skilled in the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use
253
the same.

Ariad argued that the statute merely required a written description
“(i) of the invention, and (ii) of the manner and process of making
and using it,” which should be “in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use

245

Id. The court noted that “there is no descriptive link between the table of
decoy molecules and reducing NF-[K]B activity.” Id.
246
Id. at 1358.
247
Id.
248
Id. at 1342.
249
Id.
250
In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
251
Id. at 1342–51.
252
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1343.
253
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); see also Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1343.

JAKAS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1320

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

6/24/2012 4:51 PM

[Vol. 42:1287

254

the same.”
Thus, Ariad’s reading merged the written description
requirement and the enablement requirement. The court, however,
disagreed with this reading and confirmed that the specification must
contain (i) a written description of the invention and (ii) a written
description of the manner and process of making and using the
invention “in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable
255
any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same.”
The
court further explained that the written description requirement has
256
been “expressly” included in the Patent Act as early as 1793.
The
court noted that Congress has never indicated any intention to
remove or amend the requirement despite numerous recodifications
257
of the Patent Act.
Finally, the court also noted that the separate
written description requirement has been a staple of the “quid pro
258
quo” of patent law where one must describe what his invention is.
Without this description, the public would not know an inventor
possessed his claimed invention, and it would not know the breadth
of the patent and whether or not it was infringing on the patent.
Second, the CAFC examined Supreme Court precedent and
agreed with Lilly’s argument that the Supreme Court has “continually
confirmed the existence of a separate written description
259
requirement.”
The CAFC looked to Morse, noting that the Court
rejected the inventor’s broad claim because he had not described
and could not show possession of the process that he was claiming,
260
which indicated that he had not invented what he claimed.
Looking to Schriber-Schroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., the CAFC
261
discussed the Supreme Court’s post-1836 interpretation of § 112.
In Schriber-Schroth, the Court held that § 112 required a patent
application to satisfy enablement and “to inform the public during
the life of the patent of the limits of the monopoly asserted, so that it

254

Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1343 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1344. Part “(i)” is the written description requirement and part “(ii)” is
enablement. See id.
256
Id. at 1345.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1345. (citing O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853); SchriberSchroth Co. v. Cleveland Trust Co., 305 U.S. 47 (1938); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002)). Schriber involved a patent for an
improvement of the pistons in a gas engine. Schriber--Schroth , 305 U.S. at 57. The
Court examined an amendment to the patent that described “flexible” webs where
the original claim only described “extremely rigid” webs. Id. at 54–55.
260
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1346 (citing Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) at 113).
261
Id.
255
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may be known which features may be safely used or manufactured
262
without a license and which may not.” Finally, the CAFC looked to
the more recent Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.
263
The Court in Festo noted that a patent application must
decision.
“describe, enable, and set forth the best mode of carrying out the
264
invention.” Further, the Court noted that an inventor’s claim must
265
be the same as the disclosed specification.
Essentially, the
specification cannot be broader than the actual invention. If this is
266
the case, the claims should not issue.
Once again, the CAFC
reiterated that the purpose of the written description is “to provide
notice of the boundaries of the [patentee’s] right to exclude and to
267
define limits,” or in other words, to “disclose and teach[].”
Third, the CAFC briefly noted that it was obligated to uphold
the separate written description requirement under the doctrine of
268
stare decisis.
To that end, the court expressed the common
262

Id.
Id. at 1347.
264
Festo, 535 U.S. at 736. The primary issues in Festo involved prosecution history
estoppel and the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 726. The inventor in Festo amended
his original claims in order to avoid a rejection from the Patent Office under § 112.
Id. at 728. The original application contained a method of operation that was
“unclear.” Id. Prosecution history estoppel arises when a patent applicant amends
his claims during patent prosecution in order to ensure patentability. Id. at 735.
When a patent applicant amends his claims, he is estopped from using the doctrine
of equivalents with regard to the amended claim in a subsequent infringement suit.
Id. at 734–35. The doctrine of equivalents is a court-made doctrine that allows a
patent to cover not only the literal meanings of a patentee’s claims, but also
equivalents that a court could infer the patentee intended to cover; it provides the
patentee with additional protection. Id. at 731–32. See generally Graver Tank & Mfg.
Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950) (discussing the doctrine of
equivalents). Even though these amendments are usually designed to avoid
potentially invalidating prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102, additional reasons will also
give rise to prosecution history estoppel. Festo, 535 U.S. at 735–36. Amendments
designed to obtain patent approval under § 112 will give rise to prosecution history
estoppel. Id. at 736. If a patentee amends his claims to narrow the scope of his
patent, it is possible that he initially claimed more than he was entitled to. Id. at 736–
37. Festo looks to all the potential reasons a claim might not issue or be found invalid
during the patent prosecution, including the written description. Id. Accordingly,
Festo supports the CAFC’s holding that the written description is not only a separate
and distinct requirement but also that it can be used to invalidate overbroad original
claims that should not have been issued in the first place. See Warner-Jenkinson v.
Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 33 (1997) (holding that a patentee may rebut a
presumption of prosecution history estoppel if he shows that the amendments were
not substantially related to patentability).
265
Festo, 535 U.S. at 736.
266
Id.
267
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1347.
268
Id.
263
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sentiment in patent law that, to encourage innovation, the courts
should not alter the “settled expectations of the inventing and
269
investing community.” This is particularly true regarding claims for
biotechnology patents, such as the one in Ariad, because the
biotechnology industry is particularly susceptible to changes in
270
expectations due to the high-risk nature of investment.
271
Fourth, the CAFC looked to the 1967 CCPA case In re Ruschig.
In In re Ruschig, the CCPA specifically distinguished written
272
description as a distinct requirement of § 112. The inventors in In
re Ruschig attempted to amend their broad original claim to include a
273
specific chemical compound that they had not originally disclosed.
In rejecting the broad claim, the CCPA explained that enablement
274
was “beside the point.” Because the specification failed to describe
the specific chemical compound that the inventors were claiming, the
275
inventors clearly did not disclose what they actually invented. Ariad
argued that the In re Ruschig rejection relied on either enablement or
276
§ 132’s rejection of new matter. The CAFC, however, interpreted In
re Ruschig as focusing on the inventor’s failure to describe the claim
itself, which would have evidenced possession of the invention, not
277
necessarily the subsequent amendments to the claim.
Fifth, the CAFC rejected Ariad’s argument that the written
description was always satisfied in the original claims because that
initial disclosure itself is the written description that must then be
278
used to determine the validity of future amendments.
The CAFC,
269

Id. at 1347; see Burk & Lemley, supra note 22, at 1668–75; Kelly, supra note 7, at
252; see also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010) (“In the area of patents, it
is especially important that the law remain stable and clear.”) (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
270
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1343.
271
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1347.
272
In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 995–96.
273
Id. at 991.
274
Id. at 995.
275
Id. at 995–96.
276
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1348; see also 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006). Section 132 ’allows
patent examiners to disallow an amendment if a party seeks to add something new to
their original claim on reissue. Id.; § 251.
277
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1348. Notably, in In re Ruschig, the court explained:
It is no help in finding a trail or in finding one’s way through the woods where the
trails have disappeared—or have not yet been made . . . to be confronted simply by a
large number of unmarked trees. Appellants are pointing to trees. We are looking
for blaze marks which single out particular trees. We see none.
379 F.2d at 994–95.
278
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349.

JAKAS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

6/24/2012 4:51 PM

COMMENT

1323

however, quickly noted that there is no statutory language that limits
279
the written description to Ariad’s interpretation.
The court
explained that the written description requirement was necessary to
280
ensure that an inventor actually invented a generic (genus) claim.
The disclosure must include a sufficient number of species within the
genus or “structural features common to the members of a genus so
that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the members of
the genus” to demonstrate that the inventor actually possessed, or
281
invented, the generic invention. The written description might also
be satisfied if, in a functional claim, those in the art can establish a
282
correlation between structure and function. Ariad’s claim failed to
satisfy the written description because Ariad’s method claims
described a genus method for accomplishing a result but did not
disclose any specific species that would accomplish the desired
283
results.
Finally, the court looked to its own precedent to describe the
284
The
scope and purpose of the written description requirement.
court articulated its’ test for written description as “whether the
disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those
skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed
285
subject matter as of the filing date.”
More specifically, one must
show “possession as shown in the disclosure” or that a person skilled
in the art would know “that the inventor actually invented the
286
invention claimed.”
Because the written description inquiry is a
question of fact, the requirements for each claim will vary depending
on ‘“the existing knowledge in the particular field, the extent and

279
Id. at 1349. The CAFC explained: “[T]he statute does not say ‘The
specification shall contain a written description of the invention for purposes of
determining priority.’” Id.
280
Id. at 1349–50.
281
Id at 1350 (citing Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1568–69 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)).
282
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350 (citing Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d
956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). The correlation might be more recognizable as the
technology and level of sophistication in the art improves, however the written
description would still only be satisfied if those of ordinary skill in the art could see
that the inventor actually possessed the full scope of the invention that he claimed.
283
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350.
284
Id. at 1351.
285
Id. (citing In re Gosteli, 872 F.3d 1008, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
286
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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content of the prior art, the maturity of the science or technology,
287
[and] the predictability of the aspect at issue.”
The court further noted that, while specific examples were not
always required and that a “constructive reduction to practice that in
a definite way identifies the claimed invention can satisfy the written
description,” the specification still must demonstrate possession of
288
the invention. Even if an inventor actually possessed an invention,
failure to articulate this possession in the specification would prevent
289
the patent from satisfying the written description requirement. The
written description requirement must satisfy the purpose of
accurately and specifically disclosing the scope of the claim so that
there is no confusion as to what the invention is and whether a
subsequent invention will infringe upon it. Additionally, the written
description requirement ensures that those who actually invent an
invention and have it in their possession are awarded the benefits of
290
the patent system.
While Ariad argued that a strict written
description requirement might hinder basic biotechnology research
performed at universities, the CAFC pointed out that the balance
291
between incentive and reward must be maintained.
Broad,
preemptive claims on inventions not yet invented would have a
stifling effect on any industry, and the biotechnology industry in
292
particular.
V. PROMOTING INNOVATION THROUGH ARIAD
Overbroad patents stifle innovation in the biotechnology
293
industry.
The written description requirement can further
innovation by limiting overbroad patents on a basic level by requiring
the actual description of a patent to outline the scope and purpose of
294
an invention.
Currently, the extent of the impact of the written
295
description requirement as articulated in Ariad remains unclear. By
placing limits on original claims, however, the written description
287
Id. (quoting Capon v. Eshhar, 418 F.3d 1349, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
288
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1352.
289
Id.
290
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353. For a description of the trade-offs of the patent
system’s exclusive rights, see supra Part I.
291
Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1353.
292
Id. at 1353–54.
293
See infra notes 323–41 and accompanying text.
294
See infra notes 311–53 and accompanying text.
295
See, e.g., Crouch, supra note 109, at 396–97; Holman, supra note 79, at 80–81.
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requirement could have its largest impact on an inventor’s decision
296
whether to patent a claim.
Additionally, the requirement
encourages inventors to finalize their inventions and pursue an end
product before seeking patent protection and public disclosure.
Through these methods, the CAFC’s requirement seems to be a
positive step towards limiting the problems associated with patents in
the biotechnology industry.
Critics of written description argue that the Ariad standard is
merely an excessive and mutated form of the enablement
297
requirement, or a “super enablement” requirement.
As Professor
Christopher Holman noted in his discussion of Lilly, “[t]he court
appears to be requiring a precise, nucleotide-by-nucleotide recitation
of chemical structure . . . while enablement merely requires a
‘reasonable correlation’ between the scope of disclosure and the
298
scope of the claims.”
Holman argues that to meet the “super
enablement” requirement, certain biotechnology genus claims must
include a “structure-based definition” which can only be satisfied by
describing a ‘“representative number’ of structurally defined
299
examples” or by describing “common structural features.” Holman
further argues that recent enablement and written description
jurisprudence shows no indication that there is a meaningful
300
distinction between these two doctrines.
Essentially, Holman
argues that every claim that fails to satisfy the written description
301
requirement would also fail to satisfy the enablement requirement.
Thus, Holman’s primary stance is that the written description
requirement has not been sufficiently separated from enablement
302
303
since Lilly. Other studies seem to support Holman’s assertions.
Overall, the primary arguments against the written description
requirement are that it is too strict and that it is not sufficiently
304
separated from the enablement requirement. Contrary to Professor
296

See Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical Industry:
The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 840–41 (2001).
297
See Holman, supra note 79, at 17; see also Regents Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at
15–16.
298
Holman, supra note 79, at 15.
299
Id.
300
Id. at 80.
301
Id. at 78.
302
Id. at 80; see also Brief for Christopher M. Holman, Inc. as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Neither Party, Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed.
Cir. 2010) (No. 02-CV-11280) [hereinafter Holman Amicus Brief].
303
See Crouch, supra note 109.
304
See, e.g., Regents Amicus Brief, supra note 4, at 8–10; Holman, supra note 79, at 15.
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Holman’s assertions, a reasonable distinction between the
enablement and the written description requirements seems
apparent: enablement is necessary to ensure that a person of
reasonable skill in the art can make and use the invention by reading
the claims, while the written description requirement provides notice
to the public about what the invention is. Since the first Patent Act,
the written description requirement and the enablement
requirement have stood side-by-side as equally important but separate
305
patent provisions.
As innovations in the biotechnology industry
become increasingly complex, additional detail in patent claims is
required to outline the scope of an invention. Otherwise, patents
that are easily enabled by improving technology but, at the time of
filing, are not the true scope of the inventor’s actual invention may
be approved.
The most recent U.S. Patent Office guidelines highlight how the
written description requirement is separate from enablement and
306
adequately limits the scope of biotechnology inventions.
One
example in the guidelines discusses a hypothetical claim for “[a]n
307
isolated antibody capable of binding to antigen X.” The guidelines
note that this claim would satisfy the written description requirement
even if the antibody were not described; it was essential that the
308
antigen would be described in detail.
Because there are only a
small number of antibodies capable of binding to antigen X and
because the process to obtain these antibodies is routine, a person of
ordinary skill in the art would know that the claimant would easily be
309
in possession of the antibodies.
This narrow claim appropriately
includes the inventor’s actual invention and shows that the inventor
310
had possession at the time of filing.
Broad claims, on the other hand, require additional scrutiny. In
another example, the USPTO guidelines list two separate written
311
descriptions that relate to a claim for “[a]n isolated nucleic acid
that encodes a polypeptide with at least 85% amino acid sequence
312
identity to SEQ ID NO: 2; wherein the polypeptide has activity X.”
305

See supra notes 1–2, 13–19 and accompanying text.
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION TRAINING MATERIALS
(2008), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/written.pdf.
307
Id. at 45.
308
Id. at 45–46.
309
Id.
310
Id.
311
They are labeled “Specification” in the guidelines. Id. at 37, 39–40.
312
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 311, at 37, 40.
306
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Specification B includes two specific locations in the sequence that
account for activity X and conservatively predicts that most mutations
313
of the sequence will not impact that activity.
Specification A
314
contains no such information.
While both descriptions enable a
person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the sequence that
315
produces activity X, only specification B indicates that the inventor
possessed the broad claim of sequences with at least eighty-five
316
percent sequence identity that could still produce activity X.
Specification B removes the chance that an inventor will be awarded
a broad patent merely on an assumption that similar sequences will
produce the same function as the disclosed sequence. As in Ariad,
the inventor must finalize his invention by disclosing a specific
correlation between the structure and function of his claims. A broad
patent should not be granted merely because an inventor lists a few
examples that will likely result in a desirable function, even if those
examples are enabling.
Through Ariad, the CAFC has taken a positive step towards
negating the problematic overexpansion of patents in the
biotechnology industry.
By enforcing the written description
requirement, the CAFC encourages actual invention and stifles broad
patent claims. While other recent Federal Circuit restrictions on
biotechnology patents may directly stifle research the written
313

Id. at 39–42.
Id. at 37.
315
The inventors would be able to use a computer to identify all the sequences
that have eighty-five percent sequence identity with the disclosed sequence. Id. at 38.
316
Id. at 39–42. This example is described in the Ex parte Kubin at the time when
it was before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. Ex parte Kubin, 83
U.S.P.Q.2d 1410 (B.P.A.I. 2007). In Ex parte Kubin, the patentee claimed a sequence
that had the function of binding to the protein CD48. Id. at 1412. The claim,
however, was a broad genus claim that included all sequences having “at least 80%”
sequence identity. Id. at 1417. Following Johns Hopkins, the court concluded that
enablement would have been satisfied because “the amount of experimentation to
practice the full scope of the claimed invention . . . would have been routine.” Id. at
1416 (citing Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Cellpro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
1998)). The written description requirement, however, was not satisfied because the
patentee did not disclose sufficient working variations of the claimed sequence that
could maintain the function of binding to CD48. Id. at 1417. The court made its
conclusion based on prior federal circuit case law, which later led to the en banc
Ariad decision. Id. at 1416 (citing Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d
916 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Enzo Biochem., Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir.
2002); Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Fiers v. Revel,
984 F.2d 1164, (Fed. Cir. 1993)). Notably, the court also rejected the claim under §
103 for obviousness. Id. at 1415. A subsequent federal circuit ruling affirmed the
obviousness rejection and accordingly did not need to address the written
description rejection. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
314
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description doctrine itself will neither stop nor slow down research at
317
universities.
Rather, because the written description requirement
protects actual invention through full investment over theoretical
research at its early stages, the industry should be further encouraged
to invest in both basic research at universities, which can still lead to
profitable breakthroughs, and in specific products that will actually
318
have practical use when released to the public.
Eventually, once
these products are fully disclosed, further research can be performed
without concerns about infringement, and the successful patentee
will have the benefit of his completed invention.
Restrictions on broad patents and a strict written description
requirement should lead to more detailed disclosures, appropriately
awarding actual invention. When inventions are appropriately
awarded, investors know that they have a fair chance to earn a return
on their investment and thus would be encouraged to partner with
university researchers. These restrictions, however, can sometimes
have the opposite effect. One significant problem is the increasing
tendency of universities and researchers to withhold disclosure of
319
their research until they have completed their inventions.
Increased funding from pharmaceutical companies can put pressure
on academic researchers to avoid releasing information that might
320
hurt the companies financially.
Academic researchers are
321
motivated by a desire to publish their findings.
Accordingly, a
conflict of interest arises when those researchers are contractually
obligated to withhold information in order to receive funding from a
322
commercial company.
While Ariad does not seem to directly
address this issue, it promotes innovation by resolving similar
conflicts that have emerged since the enactment of Bayh-Dole
between industry and university research.

317
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09Civ.-4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418, at *147–16 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010); Moore,
supra note 164, at 158–61 (explaining how the CAFC’s restrictions on the
experimental use doctrine have severely limited its potential and possibly even
removed its viability altogether).
318
See also Michael J. Remington, The Bayh-Dole Act at Twenty-Five Years: Looking
Back, Taking Stock, Acting for the Future, 17-1 J. ASS’N U. TECH. MANAGERS 1, 14 (2005),
available at http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/files/Publication/e225136e-6ac8-476ab11c-01cde4b795be/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/98997d01-1def-4dd9-9f68026d2d0faa4f/Remington_AUTM.pdf.
319
JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY 56 (1998).
320
See, e.g., In re Synthroid Mktg. Litig., 201 F. Supp. 2d 861 (N.D. Ill. 2002).
321
See Witt & Lehnhardt, supra note 193, at 1086.
322
Id.
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Similar conflicts arise when biotechnology companies, seeking a
return on their investment, refuse to license essential research
323
A recent case involving the biotechnology company Myriad
tools.
Genetics exemplifies potential problems and potential court-offered
324
solutions.
In Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, Myriad held crucial patents over certain gene
325
Myriad’s
sequences that are linked to breast and ovarian cancer.
326
patents also covered any diagnostic or therapeutic use of the genes.
Due to Myriad’s refusal to license its patents, patients who needed
genetic sequencing of their tissue samples to screen for the mutations
327
were required to send all samples to Myriad.
Screening for the
mutation is an essential step in detecting and treating the highly
328
The negative
frequent form of cancer that the mutation causes.
323

See Schmieder, supra note 135, at 180–81.
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09Civ-4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2010). The
controversy in this case primarily focused on the patentability of isolated DNA
sequences and not specifically on the written description requirement. Id. at *3. The
policy concerns surrounding the case, however, are similar to those presented to the
biotechnology industry with regard to patent protection. For a more in depth look
at the Myriad controversy, see, e.g., Jordan Paradise, European Opposition to Exclusive
Control Over Predictive Breast Cancer Testing and the Inherent Implications for U.S. Patent
Law and Policy: A Case Study of the Myriad Genetics’ BRCA Patent Controversy, 59 Food
Drug L.J. 133 (2004).
325
The genes where the mutations are located are called BRCA1 and BRCA2. Id.
at *56–57.
326
See id.; see also Gaia Bernstein, In the Shadow of Innovation, 31 CARDOZO L. REV.
2257, 2296 (2010).
327
Bernstein, supra note 326, at 2296.
328
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418, at *55–58.
Discussing the importance of the Myriad screening test, the court noted:
Women with BRCAl and BRCA2 mutations face up to an 85%
cumulative risk of breast cancer, as well as up to a 50% cumulative risk
of ovarian cancer. In addition, among the 10-15% of ovarian cancer
cases that are inherited genetically, 80% of women diagnosed under
the age of 50 carry mutations in their BRCAl genes and 20% carry
mutations in their BRCA2 genes. . . . Male carriers of mutations are
also at an increased risk for breast and prostate cancer. . . . The
existence of BRCA1/2 mutations is therefore an important
consideration in the provision of clinical care for breast and/or ovarian
cancer. A patient will not only learn of her risk for hereditary breast
and ovarian cancer, but also can gain information that may be useful in
determining prevention and treatment options. This information is
useful for women who are facing difficult decisions regarding whether
or not to undergo prophylactic surgery, hormonal therapy,
chemotherapy, and other measures. Testing results for the BRCA1/2
genes can be an important factor in structuring an appropriate course
of cancer treatment, since certain forms of chemotherapy can be more
effective in treating cancers related to BRCA l/2 mutations.
324
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consequences of Myriad’s refusal to license were felt by both
329
330
individual patients and researchers who examine the genes. The
latter, unable to perform the screenings independently, were
restricted in their ability to improve upon the existing technology,
331
correct errors by Myriad, or discover additional mutations.
Researchers at the University of Pennsylvania and the Yale DNA
Diagnostics Laboratory are two of a number of research institutions
332
whom Myriad forced to cease BRCA genetic testing.
In order to
correct the negative consequences of the Myriad patents, Judge Sweet
in the Southern District of New York held that patents on genetic
sequences similar to the Myriad patents are categorically
333
unpatentable subject matter under § 101.
Judge Sweet’s ruling appears to be a potential solution to
Myriad’s attempt to hinder further innovation. But while the
negative impact to further innovative research, particularly at
universities, seems apparent in the Association for Molecular Pathology
case, the reality is far more complex. Much of Myriad’s research was
performed in conjunction with universities, primarily the University
334
of Utah.
Further, Myriad collaborated with, and received
335
significant funding from, the U.S. government for its research.
Similarly to Ariad, public entities who currently receive little financial
benefit from patents funded and performed much of the
336
If,
groundbreaking research that led to Myriad’s patented gene.
however, private companies that do not receive significant federal
support are unable to recover their investments through patent
protection, the incentive for these companies to invest in high-risk yet
groundbreaking research like the BRCA project would be greatly
337
diminished. Despite Myriad’s questionable actions, overall research

Id. at *56–57 (internal citations omitted).
329
Many patients could not afford the screening test, even if their treatment
providers had the capability to perform the screening. Id. at *58–61.
330
Id. at *58–61, *75–83.
331
Id. at *65. Some labs even had access to better technology than Myriad and
could perform “more comprehensive testing than Myriad’s standard testing services.”
Id. at *66.
332
Id. at *61–64.
333
Id. at *147–64.
334
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418, at *51–52.
335
Id. at *50–54.
336
Id. at *53–54. The federal researchers involved in the BRCA1 research were
excluded as co-inventors of the BRCA1 patents and Myriad has not paid royalties to
other parties. Id.
337
Id. at *27.
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would likely be hindered more than it would be promoted if
companies like Myriad were to be refused patents for finalized
inventions.
Unlike the categorical ban on the genetic sequence patent in
the Association for Molecular Pathology case under § 101, the Ariad
decision maintains a better balance between preventing companies
like Myriad from abusing broad or crucial patents, while at the same
time allowing investors in biotechnology research to recover their
investments for finalized products.
The written description
requirement gives courts the discretion to decide if a broad patent is
rightfully obtained and actually possessed, or if a claim is merely an
attempt to predict where research will go in the future and
338
prematurely corner the market.
For example, in 2000, Human
Genome Sciences Incorporated (HGS) was awarded a patent for an
339
important gene related to identifying and eventually treating HIV.
At the time of filing, HGS was unaware of the many functions and the
340
To identify the gene, HGS used
general utility of the gene.
computer analysis to generally predict the utility of the gene and its
341
function.
Shortly after HGS received its gene patent, several
independent researchers demonstrated the actual function of the
342
Unlike Myriad, however, HGS
gene as it related to the HIV virus.
has allowed universities to perform unlicensed research on the gene,
343
and is involved in several licensing agreements.
In situations like
the HGS gene patent where courts—other than the Association for
Molecular Pathology court—have been unwilling to use § 101 to limit
344
broad predictive biotechnology patents, the written description
requirement may provide a solution. A court could look to a broad
claim for a multi-functioning gene and use the written description
requirement to appropriately limit the scope of the patent or
invalidate it altogether upon a finding that the patentee did not truly
posses the actual invention that he is claiming. The written
description requirement curbs abuse of the patent system while
338

See supra notes 278–99 and accompanying text.
See Donna M. Gitter, International Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences
in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compulsory Licensing and a
Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623, 1661–62 (2001).
340
Id. at 1625–26.
341
Id. at 1625 n.11.
342
Id. at 1625–26. Additional functions were also later identified. Id.
343
Richard Li-dar, Biomedical Upstream Patenting Scientific Research: The Case for
Compulsory Licensing Bearing Reach-Through Royalties, 10 YALE J. L. & TECH. 251, 273
(2008).
344
See Gitter, supra note 339, at 1662; Wang, supra note 343, at 272–73.
339
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avoiding categorical bans on biotechnology patents that are essential
to promoting further private-public collaboration and future
innovation.
In addition, even if the written description requirement furthers
the incentive for universities to withhold research for their corporate
investor until the research is completed (and it seems unclear if this
is a significant problem at all), the end result includes a finalized
product by the researchers and increased confidence for investors. It
would be much more problematic to grant broad patents
prematurely to universities that are neither tied to industry nor
supported by adequate funding, who then might refuse to license
345
essential research technologies.
Such a policy would greatly lower
the industry’s incentive to continue funding research at universities
or other research institutions. A possible middle ground may involve
allowing entities like Ariad to somehow share in the rewards of the
346
finalized product that results from the groundbreaking discovery.
The written description requirement could accomplish this goal by
encouraging researchers to develop narrower patents that they can
license for more reasonable fees, as opposed to the excessive charges
that can result from broad patents that corner too much of the
market. Lowering overall costs should encourage greater investment
and provide further opportunity for public-private collaboration.
The intent of the Bayh-Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts is to
encourage innovation through public-private collaboration, primarily
347
by tapping into university research. If the system focuses too greatly
on obtaining patents for profit and less on promoting cooperative
research, innovation will be stifled. Under the Bayh-Dole Act,
researchers at federally funded universities continue to have an
348
obligation to disclose their work.
Knowing of this disclosure
obligation, the biotechnology industry has continued to invest in
university research, and technology transfer at universities also
349
continues to grow.
Even with potential conflicts between the
entities, universities and the biotechnology industry are still
345

See Schmieder, supra note 135, at 180–81.
See, e.g., Carol M. Nielsen & Michael R. Samardzija, Compulsory Patent Licensing:
Is it a Viable Solution in the United States?, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 509
(2007); Simone A. Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other Market Failures: A Case for
a Limited Compulsory Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 48 HOWARD L.J. 579 (2005).
347
See supra notes 151–83 and accompanying text.
348
See Witt & Lehnhardt, supra note 193, at 1082.
349
See, e.g., Vicki Loise & Ashley J. Stevens, The Bayh-Dole Act Turns 30, 2 SCIENCE
TRANSLATIONAL
MED.
52,
Oct.
6,
2010,
available
at
http://stm.sciencemag.org/content/2/52/52cm27.full.pdf.
346
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interdependent when it comes to biotechnology research.
The
written description requirement articulated in Ariad shows the CAFC
is aware of the negative incentives associated with overbroad patents,
352
Granting overbroad patents for
particularly those for DNA.
unidentified DNA sequences, particularly those whose function may
vary greatly, would hinder innovation. As in the Ariad case,
companies like Ariad would be able to prevent others from
completing the necessary research to develop an actual product for
the described concept.
The relationship between the three major players in the
development of biotechnology—the government, the private
industry, and the universities—has been described as “antagonistic”
353
and at the same time “cooperative and even symbiotic.”
For this
reason, maintaining a balance between encouraging basic research
354
and promoting patent protection to recoup profits is a difficult task.
If universities obtain more power to protect their broad basic
research, there will be fewer opportunities for private industries to
invest. Accordingly, there would be a negative impact on universities
if they were to oppose the interests of the pharmaceutical industry to
develop finalized workable products. Further, public funding and
the academic researchers’ desire to advance in their field preserve
355
the potential to develop breakthrough products.
Similarly,
groundbreaking discoveries will always provide universities with
reputational benefits, which draws additional investors, students, and
356
distinguished faculty members. While Congress designed the BayhDole and Hatch-Waxman Acts to give researchers further incentive to
perform high-risk biotechnology research, the benefits presented
350

Research universities rely on investment and funding to support further
academic research, while the biotechnology industry relies on the manpower and
risk management of universities to complete complex research projects. Brief for the
Biotechnology Industry Organization and the Association of University Technology
Managers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology
v. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 24248 at *24–26 (Fed.
Cir. Filed Nov. 23, 2010) (No. 2010-1406).
351
Id.
352
See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349–53 (noting that
Ariad illustrates the problems associated with generic claims, particularly those in the
“biological arts,” and how these broad patents, merely by describing a function, cover
compounds that are only later “actually invented” through the subsequent work of
the pharmaceutical industry); Id. at 1358–59 (Newman, J., concurring).
353
See Golden, supra note 153, at 131.
354
Id. at 135–36.
355
Id. at 148–51.
356
Madley v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (2002).
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have always been for meaningful discoveries that actually contribute
357
to innovation.
To that end, the Ariad decision is a step in the right direction to
fix some of the imbalances arising from the current trends in the
biotechnology industry and biotechnology patents.
Disclosure
continues to be an essential requirement of university-funded
358
research, and the written description requirement in Ariad requires
359
a specific disclosure of the patented invention.
A specific DNA
sequence, even slightly altered, may have a significantly different
360
function than the claimed invention.
A specific description both
encourages streamlined research into useful products and
discourages inventors who might attempt to game the system by
teaching others to make something that the inventor did not yet
possess. Accordingly, the written description requirement articulated
in Ariad gives judges another method to police abuses and promote
innovation of the patent system by basic researchers, particularly in
biotechnology where patents are so essential to future research.
Ariad merely solidifies the proposition that only those who make
meaningful contributions to the useful arts should obtain patents.
There is little to suggest that university researchers will avoid
performing research if they are restricted to patents on products that
they actually invented instead of receiving broad genus patents that
361
may cover discoveries that they have not yet made.
If a patent is
worthy of a genus claim, it should be granted the rights to that
invention and all the benefits that come with it. Because universities
have additional legal protection, continue to receive public and
private funding, and receive broad discretion with the use of those
funds, there is nothing to indicate that they may not allocate those
funds to additional research that will lead to breakthrough
362
discoveries and the spoils of that research.
Because academic
researchers are motivated by financial and personal incentives, a
better incentive for research is to allow both motivating factors, the
363
pursuit of knowledge and the pursuit of profit, to co-exist. Without

357

See Moore, supra note 164, at 153.
See supra notes 182, 319–30 and accompanying text.
359
Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
360
See Holman Amicus Brief, supra note 79, at 12.
361
See generally Regents Amicus Brief, supra note 4 (discussing the major benefits
granted by Bayh-Dole yet failing to note setbacks since the application of the written
description requirement as articulated in Ariad).
362
See Rowe, supra note 26, at 301–09.
363
See Golden, supra note 153, at 153–54.
358
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restrictions on patents like the written description requirement
articulated in Ariad, the ability for researchers to innovate would be
severely restricted by the constant threat of infringement and the
over-patenting of inventions not yet invented.
Further, due to the nature of the biotechnology industry, where
there is uncertainty today there is unlikely to be uncertainty
tomorrow. As the biotechnology industry improves, it should become
easier for researchers to disclose the number of species that they
actually invented, thus allowing legitimate genus claims. The level of
technology, however, is not the focus of the written description
requirement. The written description simply looks to the breadth of
the claims and determines whether the claimed scope is what the
inventor possessed on the day he filed for a patent application. The
requirement places less emphasis on what others could accomplish
based on the inventor’s claims (an expansive enablement approach)
but places more pressure on the inventor to fully articulate the
boundaries of the invention (a limiting approach). At the same time,
inventors are encouraged to provide more detailed disclosure,
rewarding the public with more information that other researchers
can use for further innovation. Accordingly, with fewer restrictive
patents issued and more specific disclosures from university
researchers, more opportunities for investment should become
available. This will foster further public-private collaboration. Far
from discouraging the congressional motivations for Bayh-Dole and
Hatch-Waxman, the written description requirement should only
encourage researchers to fully develop techniques that identify
potentially useful products and mechanisms and to not simply look
for an easy way to obtain overreaching patent rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
After Ariad, there undoubtedly is a distinct and separate written
description requirement in U.S. patent law under 35 U.S.C. § 112.
The overall impact of the written description requirement to modern
technology, however, is unclear thus far. Regardless, Ariad as a whole
reasserted the notion that to gain the benefit of the exclusive rights
of a patent, an inventor is obligated to specifically describe the
invention that was actually invented. This not only maintains the
quid pro quo of the patent monopoly but also notifies members of
the public of the scope of the invention so that they can avoid
infringement. An inventor should only receive a broad patent if the
inventor can show that he made the broad discovery and not just a
small fraction of what he allegedly claims. The written description
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requirement is an essential tool in preventing inventors from abusing
the patent system by claiming more than they have a right to claim.
The patent system rewards those who perform their due
diligence and actually contribute to the useful arts.
In the
biotechnology industry, with high risk comes high reward. Through
public funding, special protections, and out-of-market motivations,
universities are in a unique position to bear the high risk associated
with developing novel biotechnology products.
Congress
acknowledged the need to support such entities by passing the BayhDole and Hatch-Waxman Acts. These Acts sought to promote and
continue to promote innovation, particularly in the biotechnology
industry. While these Acts have had a positive impact on innovation,
the complexity of the technology and the rate at which the
technology has advanced make it difficult for the patent system to
keep pace. Blocking technologies and excessive costs for licensing
are just two of the major problems that arose out of a system that was
unable to adequately comprehend the scope and significance of
particular inventions.
Ariad and the written description requirement further the intent
of the Bayh-Dole and Hatch-Waxman Acts to promote innovation and
encourage cooperation between public and private actors. By
rewarding actual invention, the Federal Circuit further encourages
the symbiotic relationship between the biotechnology industry and
universities. Even though some commentators criticize the written
description requirement for being a mere extension of enablement
and for having a negligible impact, Ariad has greater significance for
the policies that the requirement advances and its more targeted
inquiry. The written description requirement in Ariad avoids an
inquiry into what others can accomplish based on a disclosure, and
instead encourages an inventor to set the specific boundaries of his
actual invention. For an unpredictable field like biotechnology, it is
important to emphasize limitations as opposed to allowing inventors
to advantageously use unpredictability to claim more than they are
entitled to.
Patents reward invention.
Innovation is to be
encouraged and not stifled. The detail that the written description
requirement mandates not only informs other inventors of the
claimed invention so that they can innovate further but also provides
the proper incentive to those who work to create a truly useful
technology.

